What are Israel and Syria negotiating, and why could it be historic?
Spanish
Muhsen AlMustafa, investigador del centro Omran de estudios estratégicos, aclara que “no estamos ante una negociación de paz en el sentido tradicional, sino ante una desactivación de tensiones en materia de seguridad”. A su juicio, el diálogo busca “reafirmar y ampliar el marco del Acuerdo de Separación de 1974”, con medidas como nuevas zonas desmilitarizadas y mecanismos de vigilancia conjunta.
AlMustafa también destaca el papel de EEUU como “mediador pragmático”. Washington estaría utilizando el levantamiento de sanciones como moneda de cambio, con el objetivo de “aislar la presencia iraní en el sur de Siria y acercar gradualmente a Damasco a una posición neutral o no hostil respecto a Israel”. No obstante, subraya que sus expectativas deben ser “cautelosas”.
La soberanía sobre los Altos del Golán constituye el principal obstáculo que podría hacer descarrilar las conversaciones en curso. “La cuestión de los Altos del Golán sigue siendo una barrera estructural. Si bien el actual liderazgo sirio puede estar abierto a congelar las reivindicaciones o dejar de lado la cuestión a corto plazo, cualquier reconocimiento formal de la soberanía israelí sobre el Golán es políticamente tóxico en Damasco, incluso bajo un gobierno de transición. Además, la dinámica interna de Israel, en particular con una coalición de derecha recelosa de cualquier compromiso territorial, también limita el margen de maniobra”, arguye AlMustafa.
English
Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explains that “this is not a peace negotiation in the traditional sense, but rather a process of de-escalating security tensions.” He sees the dialogue as an attempt to “reaffirm and expand the framework of the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement,” through measures such as establishing new demilitarized zones and joint monitoring mechanisms. AlMustafa also highlights the role of the United States as a “pragmatic mediator,” with Washington using sanctions relief as a bargaining chip to “isolate Iran’s presence in southern Syria and gradually steer Damascus toward a neutral or non-hostile stance toward Israel.” He stresses, however, that expectations in this regard must remain “cautious.”
Sovereignty over the Golan Heights is described as the main obstacle that could derail ongoing talks. “The Golan issue remains a structural barrier. While the current Syrian leadership may be open to freezing claims or setting the matter aside temporarily, any formal recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan remains politically toxic in Damascus, even under a transitional government. Moreover, Israel’s internal dynamics, particularly with a right-wing coalition wary of any territorial concessions, also limit room for maneuver,” AlMustafa noted.
AlMustafa does not expect Syria to move toward normalization unilaterally or in isolation. It is more likely, he says, that Damascus will remain aligned with the general Arab position, especially that of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Any step toward normalization will come as part of a collective consensus, not as a bilateral breakthrough. It will also be conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state, its recognition by Israel, and the foundations for coexistence on the ground.

