Research contributions, statements, and references

  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies, speaking to Alhurra about the fate of senior Assad regime officers who went into hiding after the regime’s fall, said that some of these officers fled to countries such as Russia, Libya, and Iraq, or to areas controlled by the SDF, while others returned to their original regions to hide or prepare to flee later. Although they do not currently pose a major threat, he warned of the potential escalation of their danger in the future, especially in the coastal regions and the rural areas of Homs and Hama.

    He noted that some security campaigns are portrayed as targeting the Alawite sect, while in reality they are directed against remnants of the former regime without sectarian or regional discrimination, warning against the use of such rhetoric to fuel divisions. AlMustafa outlined three possible scenarios for the escalation of the threat: receiving external support from regional actors such as Iran, exploiting internal security chaos, or playing on sectarian tensions in areas of former regime influence. He stressed the importance of taking strict measures, including border control, intensifying intelligence work, and strengthening national reconciliation to ensure the stability of the new Syria and prevent the return of the former regime’s influence.

    Published in:
    Image2025-03-07
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explained that “the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and the army presents a major challenge for the new Syrian administration.” He told Al-Hurra that at the top of these challenges is the process of integrating the military factions into the army after their dissolution. The file of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains unresolved, especially as negotiations between the two sides continue. AlMustafa noted that the vision presented by its leader Mazloum Abdi resembles, to some extent, the situation of the Peshmerga forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, saying: “This demand is primarily rooted in ethnic reasons.”

    Regarding the southern factions, he explained that their insistence on remaining as “solid blocs” stems from “their own local and regional motivations.” He does not believe that “adopting this model, based on solid blocs within the military institution, will make it more efficient; rather, it could strengthen loyalty to the faction at the expense of loyalty to the military institution as a whole.”

    On the other hand, AlMustafa added that the demands to join as solid blocs do not seem to align with the vision of the new administration, which is moving toward building a professional army based on the principle of citizenship. He said this divergence could create a major challenge in resolving the issue and might even lead to future military conflict, though this is unlikely in the near term.

    The national conference may compel all military factions to dissolve themselves and merge into the Ministry of Defense under the legitimacy it will acquire. The researcher added that pressure tools may also include offering political guarantees to these factions or providing temporary privileges to facilitate integration. However, “the military option remains possible if these factions refuse to comply,” AlMustafa concluded in his statement to Al-Hurra.

    Published in:
    Image2025-01-16
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    Commenting on Lavrov’s statements and their implications, Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said: “Lavrov does not necessarily mean Syria itself, but the presence in Syria is important for Russia and vital for its pathway into Africa in general and Libya in particular.” AlMustafa told Al-Hurra that “it cannot be said that Russia has lost its bases in Syria until the last Russian soldier leaves, but it seems that the new Syrian administration is exercising extreme caution before making any decision on this matter.”

    “Several things should not be forgotten… First, Turkey has provided Russia with assurances about its influence in Syria, in return for not engaging in direct military support for Assad, in addition to political reassurance messages from the Syrian military operations command during the ‘Deterring Aggression’ battle,” AlMustafa said. He continued: “Second, Russia has a signed agreement with the Syrian state represented by the former regime, and there is no information or source indicating that this agreement was suspended after the fall of the regime, meaning it is still in effect on the ground.” At the same time, the Syrian researcher noted that “it may later be amended or canceled, depending on what the new administration sees as serving the country’s interest.”

    As for the third element, AlMustafa explained: “Beyond emotions, and despite Russia’s crimes against the Syrian people and its full awareness of them—similar to other actors like Iran—it may be in Syria’s interest to maintain a good relationship with Russia and thus its bases, through re-negotiating a new agreement with it.” He justified this by saying: “It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (with veto power), and it can be useful in several vital areas necessary for rebuilding the state and possibly the army after the massive destruction it suffered. This could serve as a form of material and moral compensation for the crimes Russia committed in Syria.”

    Published in:
    Image2025-01-15
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that “Israel recently took control of Mount Hermon’s peak, which stands at 2,814 meters, for strategic and security reasons, taking advantage of the security vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Assad’s army after the fall of his regime.”

    He added in his statement to Al-Hurra that “Mount Hermon is considered a highly strategic site, as it provides an advanced observation point overlooking wide areas in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. This location enables Israel to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities and monitor military movements in the region.”

    Published in:
    Image2024-12-18
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies told Al-Hurra that “from a logistical capability standpoint, it will certainly take many years. The state needs vast amounts of money to rebuild Syria’s military capacities from scratch, and it also needs countries willing to supply Syria with weapons and ensure the continuous and sustainable development of these arms.”

    AlMustafa explained that “most of the weapons destroyed by Israel would not have withstood any upcoming war anyway, as most of them were scrap. Assad’s regime had not worked on developing the army for many years, even before the revolution in 2011.” He added that “in reality, rebuilding the army does not appear to be a clear priority for the new government. The priority today is to impose security, provide services, and re-establish control over all Syrian territory. However, a parallel path could be activated through preliminary steps to quietly rebuild the army. Currently, according to operations commander Ahmad al-Sharaa, the focus is on dismantling the security apparatuses. As for the old army, it has not been discussed in depth, and what has been mentioned is only in the form of hints about the military institution.”

    He continued: “A few days ago, mandatory service members in the army were granted a general amnesty, along with cards ensuring they will not be stopped for the time being. Nothing has been said about the fate of the volunteers. Meanwhile, the new structure may be subject to lengthy discussions before being approved, especially since military factions are completely different from an organized army structure. A key question will later emerge: will the direction be toward building a professional army based on volunteers, or reactivating compulsory service in a different way than before?” He stressed that “priorities are different and challenges immense, especially since Assad’s regime almost completely destroyed Syria’s infrastructure, and Israel has completed the destruction of both the infrastructure and military capabilities.”

    Published in:
    Image2024-12-12
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    According to Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and Syrian military expert Ismail Ayoub, the task of protecting the presidential palace is distributed among three entities. The first is the Republican Guard, the main force responsible for safeguarding Assad’s palace, established decades ago specifically to ensure his and his regime’s protection. For many years, members of the Republican Guard were carefully selected based on physical fitness, loyalty to the regime, and, in many cases, sectarian affiliation, AlMustafa explained. He noted that “the Republican Guard includes highly trained units,” but he doubts its effective strength given the battlefield realities witnessed in Syria over the past week.

    The second is the 4th Armored Division. Although protecting the palace is not its formal mission, this military unit has played a major role for decades in securing the surroundings of Damascus. AlMustafa explained that “the Republican Guard and the 4th Division act as a defensive body for the presidential palace.”

    The third is the Special Forces, led by General Suhail al-Hassan. These three units together are responsible for protecting the presidential palace, according to the researcher’s statement to Al-Hurra. However, he added: “It is not known whether these divisions would actually fight if Damascus’s countryside and surrounding areas fall. Where would they fight? In the cities? That depends on the outcome of the battle in Homs being led by the opposition factions.”

    Published in:
    Image2024-12-07
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explained that the city carries “military, political, and social importance all at once.” Militarily, Homs hosts the military colleges complex, the 11th Division, the 18th Armored Division, and the command of the central region. If the armed factions managed to reach these sites, it would help them “seize larger amounts of weapons,” according to AlMustafa.

    Moreover, he told Al-Hurra that Homs “includes a large support base for the Syrian regime from the Alawite community, and if its members positively receive the reassurances sent by the armed factions and remain in their neighborhoods without confrontation, the equation the regime has relied on for many years will be overturned.” AlMustafa believes that “the return of fighters and civilians to it now, after 10 years, would strike a blow to the policy adopted by the Syrian regime.”

    The Syrian researcher also pointed out that armed factions’ control over Homs “would mean cutting the regime’s supply lines southward toward the coastal cities of Syria.” It would also sever all the secondary roads linking the coast with the Syrian desert, according to AlMustafa.

    Published in:
    Image2024-12-06
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explained that Hama represents a very strategic location for all parties involved in the Syrian conflict, especially for the armed factions currently trying to seize it. He told Al-Hurra that the city’s importance stems from its geographical position on the international M5 highway, as well as its symbolic role in the Syrian revolution, given its long history of opposing the Assad regime.

    AlMustafa said: “Whoever controls the city of Hama will hold the initiative for broader military advances. The city also has an important transportation hub that facilitates large-scale military operations.” Hama connects with the Syrian desert, as well as with the Idlib countryside, and it hosts a military airport. According to the Syrian researcher, controlling it would also mean easier control over Homs than expected. He continued: “It could also spark movements in the Damascus countryside, Daraa, and Sweida to expel regime units, thereby imposing a new military reality.”

    Published in:
    Image2024-12-04
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies who has been following the activities and formations of the Syrian army for years, explained that “the regime appears alone in the battle. It knew that and did not resist.” He told Al-Hurra: “Its soldiers’ morale is also broken, and they knew they were alone on the battlefield without Iranian militias or Russian forces… it is noticeable that there is a collapse in the chain of command and orders.”

    He added: “The current situation resembles the collapse of regime forces at the end of 2012, when they withdrew from vast areas,” noting that the balance of the conflict only tilted back in their favor after the entry of Iranian militias on the ground and the Russian intervention in 2015. AlMustafa stated that “the Syrian regime could launch a counter-offensive,” but clarified that this “needs time.” He explained: “Practically, the Syrian regime has been shocked and is now outside the battle’s calculations. It may take months if it decides to resist.”

    Published in:
    Image2024-11-30
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, on the other hand, stated that the regime has “been able throughout the past year and until now to distance itself from the battle.” He told
    Al-Hurra: “It has not and does not want to intervene because it knows the consequences of such intervention given Israel’s intense aggressiveness.”

    Contrary to the prevailing belief of a Syrian-Iranian rift, Iran itself may have told the regime not to intervene, according to AlMustafa. He explained that this may be related to ensuring that it “does not lose the gains it has achieved over the past years… thus allowing the Iranian presence in Syria to last longer.”

    Published in:
    Image2024-10-07
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    According to Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, the Syrian regime is seeking to attract volunteers in order to “form a solid bloc within the army.” This “solid bloc” relies on volunteers who demonstrate greater loyalty to the regime compared to conscripts serving under compulsory service, who are seen as less reliable due to social and sectarian divisions, he told Al-Hurra.

    He added that “the demobilization of groups from reserve and compulsory service is part of this strategy to ease burdens on certain civilian sectors,” and also “an attempt to reduce waves of asylum as many young people migrate to escape prolonged service, in addition to other reasons for displacement and migration.” While the exact future form of that “army” is still unclear, AlMustafa believes the goal is to “create a military force composed of individuals with stronger loyalty, higher skills, and attractive financial benefits, allowing the regime to reinforce its military and security grip more effectively.”

    AlMustafa explained that “the term professional army is far too big for Assad’s army.” He noted that “the core criterion within it is loyalty, not professionalism, although the term ‘professional’ is usually applied to volunteer-based armies.” Nonetheless, this does not mean the regime’s future army “will not train or adopt new tactics, but it will fall far short of confronting an organized military force or another army, while maintaining a high destructive effectiveness against the Syrian people,” the researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies concluded.

    Published in:
    Image2024-09-13
  • Icon from Carbon by IBM - undefined

    uhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that the security restructuring announced by the Syrian regime has nothing to do with Arab initiatives, explaining that Damascus does not allow any external party to interfere in its security structures. He considers these changes to be a natural outcome for any regime that has gone through conflict, as it later seeks to review the strengths and weaknesses that emerged over the years.

    AlMustafa points out that the regime may exploit Arab and Western calls for reform to craft a suitable image for itself, enabling it to tighten its grip on the street, but without touching the essence of its security structure or management style. He stresses that Assad’s changes remain superficial, as the new security figures are no different from the old ones in terms of methodology and performance. He also notes that strengthening the position of the “Baath Party” at this stage is part of the regime’s plan, as it relies on it as a political tool that provides cover and a partisan facade concealing its sectarian nature. In this way, the party is used as a means of mobilization and control, instead of implementing genuine political reform or opening the door to structural changes in power.

    Published in:
    Image2024-01-30

Search the site

Enter a term or choose filters, then select Search. Includes public text and parliament data; PDF and external-embed text is not indexed. Dates use publication dates or the date shown in the register.