Research contributions, statements, and references
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Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, specializing in military and security affairs, believes that the military cooperation agreement between Syria and Turkey reflects a shift in Ankara’s approach—from supporting factions to forming an institutional partnership with Damascus—giving relations a new direction. He expects the agreement to enhance the Syrian government’s ability to maintain security but rules out its development into a joint defense pact in the near future due to Syria’s fragile legal framework, international reservations (especially concerning Israel), and the sensitivity of Turkey’s position within NATO.
He points out that Turkish support will likely be limited to logistical equipment, armored vehicles, surveillance technologies, and possibly limited air support, which would gradually improve the efficiency of the Syrian army without drastically altering regional power balances. He also stresses that Ankara’s focus on confronting the SDF does not mean sidelining the Sweida issue or Israeli threats, but rather reflects Turkey’s priority of preventing the SDF from imposing a separate reality, while relations with Israel remain constrained by complex regional calculations that Turkey avoids escalating directly.
Published in:2025-08-14
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The report on university students and military service draws on an article published by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy when discussing conscription costs, exemption fees, prolonged service and corruption.
Published in:2025-05-19
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Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, specializing in military and security affairs, told Enab Baladi that the Syrian state’s capacity to control weapons “appears good so far,” despite field complexities, noting that the general trend is moving toward restricting weapons to the state’s hands. He considered that the state has gradual tools to move forward, including integration programs, reconciliations, and incentives to join the military and internal security institutions, predicting the adoption of a new weapons possession law after the activation of the People’s Assembly, in line with the requirements of the phase.
He saw that the current focus on areas that were outside control or loyal to the former regime is natural given the nature of the security risks there, compared with temporary and less prioritized tolerance in traditional stronghold areas. He concluded that controlling weapons is a cornerstone for building the rule of law, consolidating decision-making centrality, ending parallel power phenomena, enhancing the state’s prestige, reducing local conflicts, and creating a safe environment for recovery, the return of displaced persons, and the launch of development.
Published in:2025-04-21
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Muhsen AlMustafa believes that the nature of the proposed security changes in Syria is still unclear, as it has not yet been decided who will lead the new security apparatus if the Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are merged. He points out that the regime will try to streamline the overlapping branches of the two agencies while keeping the non-overlapping ones, but he recalls that previous restructuring attempts failed due to the complexity and deep interconnections within the security apparatus.
He stresses that Russia has greater influence than Iran over the Syrian security services, making it a likely party behind such changes, especially given the existence of four agencies with overlapping, competing roles. In his view, any restructuring could carry a political dimension within the framework of international understandings and fall under Moscow’s attempts to reshape the security system to serve its interests.
He also argues that these changes may aim to obscure the crimes and violations committed by the security branches, but they will not succeed in deceiving international human rights bodies. Instead, they may make accountability more complicated, as international organizations would need to determine which new branch inherits the record of violations, thereby prolonging the accountability process without changing the essence of the existing security structure.
Published in:2025-03-23
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The Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen AlMustafa, ruled out the possibility of a military clash at the current stage, noting the absence of any indications pointing to that. AlMustafa, who specializes in civil-military relations, clarified that the new administration prefers to avoid bloodshed in resolving conflicts, while keeping the military option open should peaceful solutions falter.
He pointed out that the present disputes are not merely military but also political, which makes the negotiation file complex and in need of more time to narrow the gap between the parties. He added that the main military dispute revolves around the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a principal bloc, a proposal rejected by the new administration, while the political dispute centers on the SDF’s demands for federalism, something Damascus rejects for any Syrian region.
Published in:2025-01-26
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Researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa, specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, commented on the promotion decisions by saying: “It seems that the main reference relied upon by the General Command in assuming responsibility for managing the country is revolutionary legitimacy, amid an almost complete suspension of the constitution and the absence of legislative authority.”
He told Enab Baladi that with the major transformations Syria is witnessing, and for necessities interpreted by the General Command based on national interest, the new leadership has begun to take strategic decisions aimed at restructuring and developing the army and security apparatus.
According to researcher AlMustafa, the decision does not grant foreigners any commanding military status within the army but is limited to promoting them to higher military ranks. This indicates that these officers already held previous ranks, either obtained through the military leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, or as defected officers who worked within the “Deterring Aggression” operations room.
Published in:2025-01-12
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Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that indicators of collapse have increased and become clear within the Syrian regime amid the rapid disintegration of its forces and its loss of control over strategic areas. AlMustafa considered that the announcement of a 50% salary increase and the calls for volunteering in auxiliary groups were merely attempts at psychological support for the collapsing army, but Assad did not have the time to rebuild the military institution.
As for the calls for volunteering and forming auxiliary groups, they were an attempt to mobilize the Alawite community through fear, and to increase the army’s core manpower to compensate for losses as quickly as possible, according to the researcher. He believes that the repeated administrative orders for ending retention over the past two years can at least be seen as premature steps taken before reaching the structure of the “professional army” that the regime was working on, as these decisions contributed to reducing the army’s manpower at a time when the regime believed it had achieved military victory.
Published in:2024-12-09
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The report refers to the analysis of amendments to parliamentary immunity when discussing prosecution procedures, the defence minister’s role and messages directed at members of the People’s Assembly.
Referenced work: تعديل مواد الحصانة في "مجلس الشعب".. رسائل للمجتمع والأعضاء الجدد.
Published in:2024-11-10
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The news report reuses earlier interview remarks about personnel needs and possible militia integration while covering the volunteer contracts announced in September 2024.
Earlier contribution: "The Syrian Ministry of Defense militarizes society through the incentives of 'Enlist contracts'".
Published in:2024-09-11
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Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, explained to Enab Baladi that the amendments introduced by the decree did not address the age of reserve military service itself, but rather paragraph “W,” which allowed those paying the financial substitute (whether enlisted or not) to pay $4,800 or its equivalent in Syrian pounds, with a reduction of $200 for each month of service performed by the enlisted person. Paragraph “W” had been added under Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023.
The researcher interpreted the addition of Decree No. 20, which introduced the option of paying a reserve service substitute for disabled individuals (set at $3,000), as consistent with the regime’s current effort to present itself as offering more “care” to citizens with disabilities, by allowing them to pay a lower substitute than that stated in paragraph “W” of Article 26. It also expands the age group eligible to pay the substitute, meaning greater financial gains for the regime.
According to an analytical article published by Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies on August 6, titled “Syria’s Reserve Military Service Transformations and Objectives”, the plan regarding reserve service is driven by an attempt to ease the burden on social groups within regime-controlled areas, especially after large waves of migration, of which reserve service has been one of the main causes, aside from other economic or social reasons.
Published in:2024-08-13
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Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that the regime began about three years ago to demobilize a number of conscripts after they had spent years in reserve service.
He continued that the regime’s plan began to take shape about a year ago through issuing administrative orders to demobilize more reservists, in addition to the announcement by Major General Ahmad Suleiman, the director general of the General Administration at the Ministry of Defense in the regime’s government, about the intention to close the reserve service file and build a “professional army” based on volunteers.
AlMustafa pointed out that the regime’s current goal focuses on rebuilding the necessary human resources for the army primarily from volunteers, with the later aim of reducing reliance on conscripts, whether through mandatory or reserve service. The researcher noted that this step came because the regime realized, after years of the Syrian uprising, that those in compulsory service cannot be heavily relied upon due to the many defections and the widespread reluctance to join the army.
Published in:2024-06-30
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Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, explained the phrase in the last clause to mean that anyone who meets the conditions listed at the end of the third clause will not need a new administrative order to be covered by the demobilization decision.
He told Enab Baladi that the other clauses of the administrative order did not make much difference in terms of details, since the reserve officers in the regime’s army are mostly holders of advanced degrees or university majors requiring five years of study, and therefore their numbers are not significantly large.
The researcher linked the latest administrative order to the changes that began to appear in the regime’s military institution since last year, pointing to the trend toward creating a “professional army” and addressing the issue of reserve service, which has been a major reason behind the migration of young people from regime-held areas. According to AlMustafa, the third clause of this order complements Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023, which allowed those liable for reserve service over the age of 40 to pay a financial substitute to avoid serving in the reserves.
Published in:2024-06-11
