Regime in transition
How Assad is embracing change to maintain the status quo

This article was published at Syria in Transition: https://bit.ly/3ABtDTv

The word “transition” has never been welcomed in Damascus as it is synonymous with “regime change”. The Russians suppressed its use in the drafting process of UNSCR 2254, and the UN Special Envoy has studiously kept it in his banished words list. Recently, however, the word has regained some popularity in the Syrian capital, with none other than Bashar Assad leading the way in its renewed use. After the 15 July parliamentary elections Assad declared: “The conflict [in Syria] had been a military conflict and a constitutional conflict. It was about preserving the constitution that represents the essence of the state. Now this issue is behind us. Today, we are in a transitional phase that is linked to visions regarding the role of the state and its institutions, policies, and orientation." Concurrent with this statement has come change in the security and military institutions, the Baath Party, and in state-owned companies. Cumulatively, these changes point to what Assad is ready to offer the Arabs by way of ‘reforms.’ It’s not a transition in the proper sense; but neither is it fully cosmetic.

Mukhabarat re-brand

In January 2024 Syrian state media announced changes in the senior leadership of the security agencies. Major-General Ali Mamlouk was removed from his position as head of the National Security Office, with Major-General Kifah Malhem appointed as his successor. Malhem possesses all the credentials required for the role, being one of the most senior intelligence officers and a longtime friend of Basel, Bashar’s older brother who died in 1994. He is also an Alawite and belongs to the same Kalbiya clan as the Assads.

Soon after, Assad chaired a high-level meeting where a new security policy was announced. According to the official press release, the meeting concerned, "the anticipated impact of the ongoing restructuring in the security field and improving coordination between the agencies, with the development of a security roadmap based on strategic visions that address international, regional, and internal challenges and risks."

Later, in March, several reports emerged indicating that Malhem had ordered a merger of Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence into an entity named "Army and Armed Forces Intelligence." Sources in Damascus, however, have confirmed that the merger has not yet officially occurred but was still under consideration. A presidential decree at the end of March appointing Major-General Kamel Hassan as head of Military Intelligence, a position he had previously held on an acting basis, provided additional evidence that the merger had not been effected. State Security and Political Security have not yet been touched by the leadership changes but announcements are likely later in the year.

In itself, restructuring the security agencies does not amount to reform. It is doubtful that the human rights situation will improve, or that these agencies will ever be held accountable before the law. Leading Syria’s security sector for the next four to five years will be officers who have all committed heinous crimes and are subject to Western sanctions. At the same time, the regime will very likely continue to face the same inefficiencies that have beset these agencies from their inception, arising from inter-agency rivalry, poor personnel training, and outdated technology.

The changes in the personnel and structure of the security agencies is believed to have been in response to a request by Riyadh, which wants to see sufficient reforms to warrant better relations and financial support. With the same objective, the regime also announced the dissolution of military field courts and an end to civilians being tried before military courts. The regime will of course not allow the Saudis to dictate the timing or scale of the restructuring, and any new security policy will require years to roll out, and will most certainly fall short of accepted definitions of security sector reform. The future of the Fourth Division, led by Assad’s brother Maher, is said to be under discussion with the Saudis. It remains the most powerful Syrian security actor of all, and its fate will be a useful barometer of the extent of change that the Assads are willing to countenance.

Army goes professional

Parallel to these security agency developments, the regime has made several significant changes to the army. These include some personnel changes but also an overhaul of the recruitment process and of reserve service, and various legislative decrees on conscription and the professionalisation of the army.

In March 2024 Assad issued an extensive list of new appointments to the General Staff and to division and brigade leadership. Notably, Major-General Zuhair Assad was removed from command of the Second Corps, and Major-General Suheil al-Hassan was appointed to lead the Special Forces. Al-Hassan is very close to the Assads, having attended the same Alawite religious seminary as Bashar, to whom he is tied by an oath of brotherhood.

Al-Hassan’s appointment is also largely due to his "counter-terrorism" experience gained at Air Force Intelligence, and later in transforming the Tiger Forces militia into the 25th Special Missions Division. He is believed to be the right person to rebuild the Special Forces brigades, which have suffered significant losses during years of grinding urban combat. In so doing he will likely benefit from Russian support, and the Special Forces will likely become a key regime protection force, alongside the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division.

The sectarian composition of the army remains, however, a significant obstacle to genuine reform. Of the 24 senior officers promoted, 92 per cent were Alawites – reflecting a continuation of a policy initiated by Hafiz Assad of relying on sect and loyalty rather than competence as the fundamental criterion for promotion in the military. Assad is unlikely to see this as much of a problem.

In June, meanwhile, the regime announced a plan to gradually end reserve service. Soldiers will be discharged after completing six years, then five, then four, gradually decreasing the period until it reaches two years by the end of 2025. The conscription period, however, remains unchanged at 18 months. A leaked government document said that 152,000 soldiers would be discharged from reserve service by the end of 2025 – a figure contrasting sharply with previous estimates that suggested a severe military manpower shortage.

The regime has also launched a plan to transition to an all-volunteer professional army. This began in earnest with several administrative orders that ended the reserve service of certain categories of enlisted men. Simultaneously, the army announced new recruitment contracts of five and ten years that exempted those that signed up from conscription. Significant benefits were offered to the new volunteers such as higher salaries and bonuses – such that these contracts now rival those offered by IRGC-backed militias. This might be interpreted in Arab capitals as the regime weakening Iran’s influence by absorbing militia personnel into the formal army. The flip side is that veteran IRGC militiamen are likely to form a significant bloc in the new professional army.

The regime also spoke about “redefining” the concept of compulsory service altogether, raising a potential for its  complete abolition. Such a  step will not materialise for several years yet, however, and it remains questionable whether the regime will be able fully to dispense with conscription, which is a major tool of social disciplining. Although the effectiveness of Syria’s conscript army has often been called into question (“flip flop army,” etc.), transitioning to an all-volunteer force would render the regime reliant almost exclusively on a human resource pool that had proved its effectiveness in the war against the opposition. This new army would be more sectarian, not less. 

New Baath

At its general conference in early May the Baath Party re-elected Assad as Secretary-General. It also elected a new Central Committee and expanded its number of seats from 80 to 125 - 45 of which are reserved for Assad appointees. Significant figures like Ali Mamlouk, Bouthaina Shaaban, and Luna al-Shibl (before her death) were dropped. The Central Leadership (the politburo) underwent a more extensive clear-out, with an entirely new line up of party apparatchiks being promoted, the majority from relative obscurity. The conference was said to be a starting point for the "reformation" and “repositioning” of the party that Assad has often spoken about.

Soon after the purge, the People’s Assembly elections were held, on 15 July. These were conducted under "international supervision," with the regime claiming they were "the first of [their]  kind in Syrian history." With a turnout that did not exceed 45 per cent, the Baath Party and its allies won about 70 per cent of seats. The elections were soon followed by a bevy of legislative changes. In a 23 July meeting Assad made clear that the new People’s Assembly would address many vital issues, adding that "the elections reflected the will of the Syrian people and their desire to participate in the new phase, a phase of work and rebuilding."

Historically, in terms of wielding effective power, the Baath Party has  been the junior partner to the army and security agencies. Nevertheless, it has proved itself as  a useful instrument to co-opt and organise elites. Going forward, the new leadership of the party will be expected to embrace free market reforms and demonstrate enthusiasm for anti-corruption drives. Should Assad face the prospect of having to conduct real legislative elections – to ratify a new constitution perhaps – a fresher and more effective Baath Party will be needed.

State sell-off

The regime has also been busy renovating the administrative state. Since early 2024, it has issued 46 legislative texts (20 decrees and 26 laws) – more than double the number in the same period of  2023.

Entirely new bodies created since the start of 2024 have included a General Authority for Managing State Property, a National Authority for Information Technology Services, an Earthquake Victims Support Fund, and a Student Loan Fund. Additionally, new bodies have been created to replace old ones, such as the General Secretariat of the Presidency,  the Ministry of Information, Communications, and Technology and the Blood Transfusion Foundation. 

Further, since early 2024 several public companies have been merged. The new entities include the General Company for Cement and Building Materials Production and Marketing – Omran, the General Company for Textile Industries and the General Company for Food Industries. 

Laws and regulations on the governance and management of joint-stock and public companies have meanwhile been overhauled, possibly as the prelude to future large-scale privatisation, given the current financial difficulties facing  state-owned enterprises and the need to repay $50 billion of debts to Iran. Any such sell-off of state assets would give Gulf Arabs investment opportunities in the post-conflict economy. Sanctions notwithstanding, a sell-off of the energy, construction, and light manufacturing sectors might attract the kind of Gulf investor that Assad desperately needs. With privatisation would come a new Riyadh- and Abu Dhabi-facing Syrian business elite that would lend the dictator a degree of Sunni Arab legitimacy. 

Déjà vu

Under pressure from Saudi Arabia to deliver on change, the regime has initiated an overhaul of the tools it uses to control the state. Beyond making the regime more efficient, the changes (announced or actual) are meant to appeal to an “Arab solution” to the Syria crisis: one that is likely to prioritise economic opportunities and leave core regime interests intact.

Assad’s concept of “transition” is all about shifting from “counter-terrorism” (i.e. survival) to building Regime 2.0. The key means to that objective will be to re-position the state strategically so that it can take maximum advantage of anticipated Gulf investment and UN early recovery funding. The changes do not signal any systemic change in the regime’s behaviour. They do not address core opposition demands; and they do not provide a political solution aligned with the vision of UNSCR 2254.

The most consequential effects of Assad’s transition will be the end of old networks and figures that once symbolised the regime. In the coming years, those associated with the conflict will disappear entirely, and a new post-conflict elite will emerge that will share the spoils of the reconstruction bonanza. This is likely to include a cohort of Gulf-associated businessmen who will dominate the privatised economy while Assad retains tight control over all political and security matters. It’s a sort of transition, and some may well market it as progress. Absent genuine multi-party politics and real security sector reform, however, it will be a transition to something depressingly familiar.