Research contributions, statements, and references

On 15 September 2025, Muhsen al-Mustafa presented a study coauthored with Sasha al-Alou on civilian referrals to military prisons during the Syrian revolution, examining procedures, pathways and judicial gateways through the case of Saydnaya Prison.

The presentation formed part of the Syria Prisons Museum launch, organized by the Prisons Museum Foundation at the National Museum in Damascus on 15–17 September 2025. It addressed the referral pathways and their legal and political context.

Organizer’s event report (Arabic) · Original coauthored study (Arabic)

The researcher focused on the direct repercussions of weapon proliferation on social structure and local relations. Muhsen AlMustafa, a specialist in security and military affairs and a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Studies, presented a broader approach that addressed the security, economic, and legislative dimensions of this phenomenon. He pointed out that the conflict in Syria imposed the need for armament at different levels and types, a need that became more pressing as the pace of confrontations escalated. With the later disintegration of the security control system, individual and medium weapons became a central element in local dynamics, not only as tools of combat but also as means of domination and control.

At the societal level, AlMustafa stated that the absence of the state, or the absence or suspension of regulating legislation, contributed to transforming weapons into an active party in the conflict and expanding the margin of individual armament, whether for self-protection or for settling locally rooted disputes. This random spread of weapons led to turning social disagreements into armed clashes, especially in rural and tribal areas.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa, spécialiste des affaires militaires et sécuritaires au Centre Omran, a déclaré dans un entretien accordé à L’Orient Today (15 août 2025) que l’accord de sécurité signé le 13 août 2025 entre Damas et Ankara représente la première coopération militaire directe et officielle entre les deux pays depuis la chute du régime Assad. L’accord comprend des programmes de formation militaire, un soutien technique et consultatif, ainsi qu’une assistance logistique, ce qui en fait un tournant qualitatif par rapport à la coordination informelle ou au soutien par procuration. Selon lui, cette étape place la Turquie en position de principal parrain régional du nouveau gouvernement syrien dans le secteur de la défense, grâce à un engagement institutionnel explicite qui consacre sa présence au sein de l’architecture défensive syrienne.

Concernant la dimension régionale, il estime que l’accord ne mentionne pas directement Israël (ce qui est naturel selon lui), mais qu’il donne aux institutions de défense syriennes davantage de profondeur et de structure, contribuant ainsi partiellement au repositionnement régional de la Syrie. Cependant, il exclut que l’accord limite la capacité d’Israël à mener des frappes en profondeur en Syrie ou qu’il constitue une menace directe pour celui-ci.

S’agissant de la position arabe, AlMustafa souligne que les attitudes des pays sont divergentes : si le Qatar et l’Arabie saoudite peuvent manifester leur soutien, d’autres États comme les Émirats arabes unis et l’Égypte se méfient de l’expansion de l’influence militaire turque. Sur le plan international, il affirme que les États-Unis sont de plus en plus préoccupés par le risque de marginalisation des Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) ou que cette coordination turco-syrienne dépasse certains accords de sécurité antérieurs.

Il ajoute que l’accord constitue un outil de pression sur l’Administration autonome du nord-est de la Syrie, l’obligeant soit à s’intégrer dans les institutions de l’État syrien, soit à faire face à la perspective d’une nouvelle opération militaire, notamment en raison du retard des FDS dans la mise en œuvre de l’accord du 10 mars 2025 avec Damas. Il conclut que le soutien turc aux institutions militaires syriennes renforce l’autorité de l’État central et donne à Damas des cartes supplémentaires pour gérer ses dossiers internes.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa, specializing in military and security affairs at the Omran Center, told L’Orient Today (August 15, 2025) that the security agreement signed on August 13, 2025, between Damascus and Ankara represents the first direct and official military cooperation between the two countries since the fall of Assad’s regime. The agreement includes military training programs, technical advisory support, and logistical assistance, making it a qualitative leap compared to previous informal coordination or proxy support. He believes this step places Turkey as the primary regional sponsor of the new Syrian government in the defense sector, thanks to an explicit institutional commitment that entrenches its presence within Syria’s defense structure.

On the regional dimension, he noted that the agreement does not mention Israel directly (which he considers natural), but it gives Syrian defense institutions more depth and structure, thereby partly contributing to Syria’s regional repositioning. However, he rules out that the agreement will reduce Israel’s ability to conduct deep strikes inside Syria or constitute a direct threat to it.

As for the Arab stance, AlMustafa pointed out that countries’ positions are varied: while Qatar and Saudi Arabia may show support, other states such as the UAE and Egypt remain wary of Turkey’s expanding military influence. On the international level, he stressed that the United States is increasingly concerned about the possible marginalization of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or that this Turkish-Syrian coordination could bypass some previous security arrangements.

He added that the agreement serves as a pressure tool on the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria, forcing it either to integrate into Syrian state institutions or face the possibility of a new military operation, especially with the SDF’s delay in implementing the March 10, 2025, agreement with Damascus. He concluded that Turkish support for Syrian military institutions strengthens the authority of the central state and provides Damascus with additional leverage in managing its internal files.

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, specializing in military and security affairs, believes that the military cooperation agreement between Syria and Turkey reflects a shift in Ankara’s approach—from supporting factions to forming an institutional partnership with Damascus—giving relations a new direction. He expects the agreement to enhance the Syrian government’s ability to maintain security but rules out its development into a joint defense pact in the near future due to Syria’s fragile legal framework, international reservations (especially concerning Israel), and the sensitivity of Turkey’s position within NATO.

He points out that Turkish support will likely be limited to logistical equipment, armored vehicles, surveillance technologies, and possibly limited air support, which would gradually improve the efficiency of the Syrian army without drastically altering regional power balances. He also stresses that Ankara’s focus on confronting the SDF does not mean sidelining the Sweida issue or Israeli threats, but rather reflects Turkey’s priority of preventing the SDF from imposing a separate reality, while relations with Israel remain constrained by complex regional calculations that Turkey avoids escalating directly.

Issue 51/2025 of SWP’s Middle East and North Africa Web Monitor lists the Arabic article “مدونة السلوك.. خطوة لازمة في مسيرة الإصلاح الأمني” on page 14, in the section on Syria’s transition and reconstruction. The title and source link form a bibliographic entry, not an analytical endorsement of the article.

Original work (Arabic): مدونة السلوك.. خطوة لازمة في مسيرة الإصلاح الأمني.

Mohamed Elzin Mohamed Ahmed Ibrahim’s Lubab study “Pathology of Intelligence” cites Carnegie’s “What Was Syria’s Violence About?” as reference 16. The cited material is an interview conducted by Michael Young, not a standalone research paper.

Spanish

Muhsen AlMustafa, investigador del centro Omran de estudios estratégicos, aclara que “no estamos ante una negociación de paz en el sentido tradicional, sino ante una desactivación de tensiones en materia de seguridad”. A su juicio, el diálogo busca “reafirmar y ampliar el marco del Acuerdo de Separación de 1974”, con medidas como nuevas zonas desmilitarizadas y mecanismos de vigilancia conjunta.

AlMustafa también destaca el papel de EEUU como “mediador pragmático”. Washington estaría utilizando el levantamiento de sanciones como moneda de cambio, con el objetivo de “aislar la presencia iraní en el sur de Siria y acercar gradualmente a Damasco a una posición neutral o no hostil respecto a Israel”. No obstante, subraya que sus expectativas deben ser “cautelosas”.

La soberanía sobre los Altos del Golán constituye el principal obstáculo que podría hacer descarrilar las conversaciones en curso. “La cuestión de los Altos del Golán sigue siendo una barrera estructural. Si bien el actual liderazgo sirio puede estar abierto a congelar las reivindicaciones o dejar de lado la cuestión a corto plazo, cualquier reconocimiento formal de la soberanía israelí sobre el Golán es políticamente tóxico en Damasco, incluso bajo un gobierno de transición. Además, la dinámica interna de Israel, en particular con una coalición de derecha recelosa de cualquier compromiso territorial, también limita el margen de maniobra”, arguye AlMustafa.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explains that “this is not a peace negotiation in the traditional sense, but rather a process of de-escalating security tensions.” He sees the dialogue as an attempt to “reaffirm and expand the framework of the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement,” through measures such as establishing new demilitarized zones and joint monitoring mechanisms. AlMustafa also highlights the role of the United States as a “pragmatic mediator,” with Washington using sanctions relief as a bargaining chip to “isolate Iran’s presence in southern Syria and gradually steer Damascus toward a neutral or non-hostile stance toward Israel.” He stresses, however, that expectations in this regard must remain “cautious.”

Sovereignty over the Golan Heights is described as the main obstacle that could derail ongoing talks. “The Golan issue remains a structural barrier. While the current Syrian leadership may be open to freezing claims or setting the matter aside temporarily, any formal recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan remains politically toxic in Damascus, even under a transitional government. Moreover, Israel’s internal dynamics, particularly with a right-wing coalition wary of any territorial concessions, also limit room for maneuver,” AlMustafa noted.

AlMustafa does not expect Syria to move toward normalization unilaterally or in isolation. It is more likely, he says, that Damascus will remain aligned with the general Arab position, especially that of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Any step toward normalization will come as part of a collective consensus, not as a bilateral breakthrough. It will also be conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state, its recognition by Israel, and the foundations for coexistence on the ground.

Rafael Borgoñoz Moya’s IEEE opinion paper cites the Carnegie interview “What Was Syria’s Violence About?”, conducted by Michael Young. The reference appears in Spanish edition footnote 22, page 12, and English edition footnote 21, page 10, in the discussion of Iran and sectarian tensions. The paper represents its author’s views, not necessarily those of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies or Spain’s Ministry of Defence.

Military and security affairs analyst Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that the step of removing Syria from the list of “rogue states” comes within the context of translating the American shift regarding sanctions imposed on Syria, as the previous U.S. decision to lift all sanctions represented a radical change in American policy toward Damascus.

AlMustafa added, in remarks to Erem News, “Since 1979, Syria was for the first time placed under the U.S. sanctions regime for its alleged support of terrorism, and all sanctions were linked to the state’s behavior under the Assad family, not only to post-2011 contexts.” He clarified that “even after the fall of the Assad regime, removing Syria from that list does not implicitly mean opening the door to cooperation on civilian nuclear energy, at least in the foreseeable future, given that even U.S. allies for decades have not received such cooperation.”

AlMustafa stressed that removing Syria from the list of “rogue states” is a necessary step within the framework of completely zeroing out sanctions, as this path requires ending all legal restrictions that form the basis of any type of sanction. He explained that this decision reflects a shift in the United States’ strategic vision toward Syria, and a redefinition of the nature of relations with it, in a state resembling full normalization of relations anew, and even broader than that.

He continued: “The decision comes as a complement to previous ones and within the current and upcoming package of decisions to completely remove U.S. sanctions. The latest decision is an indication of a serious attempt to reintegrate Damascus into the international system within broader arrangements that include the economy, technology, and possibly security and intelligence sharing. Overall, the lifting of sanctions represents an implicit acknowledgment that Washington no longer sees Syria as a systematic threat to U.S. interests as in past decades.”