Research contributions, statements, and references

Spanish

Muhsen AlMustafa, investigador del centro Omran de estudios estratégicos, aclara que “no estamos ante una negociación de paz en el sentido tradicional, sino ante una desactivación de tensiones en materia de seguridad”. A su juicio, el diálogo busca “reafirmar y ampliar el marco del Acuerdo de Separación de 1974”, con medidas como nuevas zonas desmilitarizadas y mecanismos de vigilancia conjunta.

AlMustafa también destaca el papel de EEUU como “mediador pragmático”. Washington estaría utilizando el levantamiento de sanciones como moneda de cambio, con el objetivo de “aislar la presencia iraní en el sur de Siria y acercar gradualmente a Damasco a una posición neutral o no hostil respecto a Israel”. No obstante, subraya que sus expectativas deben ser “cautelosas”.

La soberanía sobre los Altos del Golán constituye el principal obstáculo que podría hacer descarrilar las conversaciones en curso. “La cuestión de los Altos del Golán sigue siendo una barrera estructural. Si bien el actual liderazgo sirio puede estar abierto a congelar las reivindicaciones o dejar de lado la cuestión a corto plazo, cualquier reconocimiento formal de la soberanía israelí sobre el Golán es políticamente tóxico en Damasco, incluso bajo un gobierno de transición. Además, la dinámica interna de Israel, en particular con una coalición de derecha recelosa de cualquier compromiso territorial, también limita el margen de maniobra”, arguye AlMustafa.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explains that “this is not a peace negotiation in the traditional sense, but rather a process of de-escalating security tensions.” He sees the dialogue as an attempt to “reaffirm and expand the framework of the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement,” through measures such as establishing new demilitarized zones and joint monitoring mechanisms. AlMustafa also highlights the role of the United States as a “pragmatic mediator,” with Washington using sanctions relief as a bargaining chip to “isolate Iran’s presence in southern Syria and gradually steer Damascus toward a neutral or non-hostile stance toward Israel.” He stresses, however, that expectations in this regard must remain “cautious.”

Sovereignty over the Golan Heights is described as the main obstacle that could derail ongoing talks. “The Golan issue remains a structural barrier. While the current Syrian leadership may be open to freezing claims or setting the matter aside temporarily, any formal recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan remains politically toxic in Damascus, even under a transitional government. Moreover, Israel’s internal dynamics, particularly with a right-wing coalition wary of any territorial concessions, also limit room for maneuver,” AlMustafa noted.

AlMustafa does not expect Syria to move toward normalization unilaterally or in isolation. It is more likely, he says, that Damascus will remain aligned with the general Arab position, especially that of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Any step toward normalization will come as part of a collective consensus, not as a bilateral breakthrough. It will also be conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state, its recognition by Israel, and the foundations for coexistence on the ground.

The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) listed two works by Muhsen AlMustafa in issue 36/2025 of its bibliographic bulletin: his article on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs on page 20, and his study of companies owned by Assad’s officers on page 22. This entry records their inclusion in the bulletin’s reading list.

Military and security affairs analyst Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that the step of removing Syria from the list of “rogue states” comes within the context of translating the American shift regarding sanctions imposed on Syria, as the previous U.S. decision to lift all sanctions represented a radical change in American policy toward Damascus.

AlMustafa added, in remarks to Erem News, “Since 1979, Syria was for the first time placed under the U.S. sanctions regime for its alleged support of terrorism, and all sanctions were linked to the state’s behavior under the Assad family, not only to post-2011 contexts.” He clarified that “even after the fall of the Assad regime, removing Syria from that list does not implicitly mean opening the door to cooperation on civilian nuclear energy, at least in the foreseeable future, given that even U.S. allies for decades have not received such cooperation.”

AlMustafa stressed that removing Syria from the list of “rogue states” is a necessary step within the framework of completely zeroing out sanctions, as this path requires ending all legal restrictions that form the basis of any type of sanction. He explained that this decision reflects a shift in the United States’ strategic vision toward Syria, and a redefinition of the nature of relations with it, in a state resembling full normalization of relations anew, and even broader than that.

He continued: “The decision comes as a complement to previous ones and within the current and upcoming package of decisions to completely remove U.S. sanctions. The latest decision is an indication of a serious attempt to reintegrate Damascus into the international system within broader arrangements that include the economy, technology, and possibly security and intelligence sharing. Overall, the lifting of sanctions represents an implicit acknowledgment that Washington no longer sees Syria as a systematic threat to U.S. interests as in past decades.”

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa du Centre Omran pour les études a offert un aperçu des coulisses de l’offensive éclair lancée par les rebelles, proposant une lecture approfondie des dimensions de l’attaque qui a renversé le régime de Bachar al-Assad. Il a expliqué qu’Alep constituait la cible la plus sensible, à la fois symboliquement et stratégiquement, et que des unités d’élite de Hayat Tahrir al-Sham avaient mené des frappes précises parallèlement à des cyberattaques qui ont paralysé la capacité du régime à riposter et détruit sa structure de commandement. Il a également souligné que l’effondrement militaire n’a pas été soudain, mais le résultat d’un processus de préparation systématique entamé dès les attaques du 7 octobre 2023, accompagné de brèches sécuritaires et de compromis préalables sur le terrain.

AlMustafa a indiqué que l’effondrement des défenses à Alep avait conduit à une désintégration désordonnée des unités du régime, tandis que la libération de villes symboliques ainsi que de milliers de détenus avait suscité un large soutien populaire à l’opération. Il a précisé que l’élan populaire qui a accompagné l’offensive, ajouté à l’absence de soutien aérien russe et de l’implication iranienne, a ouvert la voie à la chute rapide et finale du régime Assad.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies offered a behind-the-scenes look at the lightning offensive launched by the rebels, providing an in-depth reading of the dimensions of the attack that toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime. He explained that Aleppo was the most sensitive target, both symbolically and strategically, and that elite units of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham carried out precise strikes in parallel with cyberattacks that disrupted the regime’s ability to respond and destroyed its command structure. He also noted that the military collapse was not sudden, but rather the result of a systematic preparation process that effectively began after the October 7, 2023 attacks, accompanied by prior security breaches and field understandings.

AlMustafa pointed out that the collapse of defenses in Aleppo led to a disorganized disintegration of regime units, while the liberation of symbolic cities along with thousands of detainees generated broad popular support for the operation. He clarified that the popular momentum accompanying the offensive, together with the absence of Russian air support and Iranian involvement, paved the way for the eventual rapid downfall of Assad’s regime.

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa, a specialist in military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper that the new European sanctions fall within the framework of assigning responsibility for violations committed on the Syrian coast, and considered them a message directed to the new Syrian government to prevent the recurrence of such violations on the coast or in any other area in the future.

Nevertheless, AlMustafa downplayed the importance of the sanctions, considering them “a mere formality,” especially since these formations will disappear and be merged within the Ministry of Defense as part of the ongoing process of restructuring the Syrian army.

AlMustafa pointed out that placing Brigadier Generals Mohammed al-Jassem and Saif Boulad on the European sanctions lists would weaken their influence within the restructured army, and would later facilitate for the Ministry of Defense to retire them and remove them from the military roster and the leadership of the divisions they currently command.

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center believes that international experiences in restructuring armies after conflicts—such as in Iraq, Lebanon, South Africa, and Rwanda—can offer inspiring lessons rather than ready-made prescriptions, since the Syrian case has its own complex specificity.

In his remarks to Syria TV, AlMustafa proposed adopting a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, stressing that reintegration should not only include the incorporation of some former members into the new army, but also their rehabilitation as active citizens within their communities.

Muhsen AlMustafa, researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, says that the benefits for Damascus are very significant; supporting countries will be able to deal with Syrian state institutions “without reservation,” including financial support, aid, and investments, in addition to contributing to the lifting of sanctions on the Central Bank of Syria.

AlMustafa also believes that European countries will follow the United States in the path of lifting sanctions imposed on Syria, noting that there are undoubtedly technical obstacles at present, especially related to legislation, but that these will fade over time.

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, specializing in military and security affairs, told Enab Baladi that the Syrian state’s capacity to control weapons “appears good so far,” despite field complexities, noting that the general trend is moving toward restricting weapons to the state’s hands. He considered that the state has gradual tools to move forward, including integration programs, reconciliations, and incentives to join the military and internal security institutions, predicting the adoption of a new weapons possession law after the activation of the People’s Assembly, in line with the requirements of the phase.

He saw that the current focus on areas that were outside control or loyal to the former regime is natural given the nature of the security risks there, compared with temporary and less prioritized tolerance in traditional stronghold areas. He concluded that controlling weapons is a cornerstone for building the rule of law, consolidating decision-making centrality, ending parallel power phenomena, enhancing the state’s prestige, reducing local conflicts, and creating a safe environment for recovery, the return of displaced persons, and the launch of development.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa a décrit la dissolution de la Huitième Brigade comme un tournant dans le démantèlement des structures militaires parallèles dans le sud de la Syrie. Il a noté que l’assassinat de Bilal al-Droubi — qui avait l’intention de rejoindre le ministère de la Défense — a probablement déclenché cette décision, car elle a été perçue par la brigade comme une menace.

AlMustafa a souligné qu’aucun groupe armé ne sera autorisé à opérer en dehors de l’autorité du nouvel État, et il a rejeté les affirmations selon lesquelles les Émirats arabes unis auraient exercé des pressions pour cette dissolution, en pointant plutôt les dynamiques internes comme principal moteur.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa described the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade as a turning point in dismantling parallel military structures in southern Syria. He noted that the assassination of Bilal al-Droubi—who intended to join the Ministry of Defense—likely triggered the move, as it was perceived by the brigade as a threat.

AlMustafa emphasized that no armed group will be allowed to operate outside the new state’s authority, and dismissed claims that the UAE pressured for the dissolution, pointing instead to internal dynamics as the main driver.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen Almustafa estime que les premières étapes de la coordination sur le terrain entre la Turquie et Israël sont en cours afin d’éviter une confrontation et de délimiter les zones d’influence en Syrie. Il suggère qu’Ankara pourrait assumer le rôle de garant pour empêcher que le territoire syrien ne soit utilisé contre Israël.

Almustafa avertit que tout arrangement séparatiste ou tout schéma de protection externe menaçant l’unité de la Syrie constitue une ligne rouge pour la Turquie, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’administration autonome kurde. Pendant ce temps, les priorités de Washington restent centrées sur la prévention du chaos, la limitation de l’influence iranienne et la garantie d’une transition politique qui ne nuit pas à ses alliés traditionnels.

English

Researcher Muhsen Almustafa believes that initial steps of field coordination between Turkey and Israel are underway to avoid confrontation and delineate zones of influence in Syria. He suggests that Ankara could assume the role of guarantor to prevent Syrian territory from being used against Israel.

AlMustafa warns that any separatist arrangements or external protection schemes that threaten Syria’s unity are a red line for Turkey, particularly concerning the Kurdish autonomous administration. Meanwhile, Washington’s priorities remain focused on preventing chaos, curbing Iranian influence, and ensuring a political transition that does not harm its traditional allies

Spanish

El investigador Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios Estratégicos, afirmó que el nuevo gobierno enfrenta enormes desafíos, pero su formación representó un paso necesario y urgente en el contexto de la nueva etapa tras la caída del régimen. Explicó que “la prioridad del presidente Ahmad al-Sharaa es erradicar la corrupción, mejorar la eficiencia de la administración pública y restablecer los servicios básicos para los ciudadanos”, y añadió que “la mayoría de los miembros del gabinete son tecnócratas seleccionados en función de su competencia e independencia, en un intento de superar el reparto de cuotas y las lealtades partidistas”.

AlMustafa agregó: “Aunque algunos ministros pertenecían al Gobierno de Salvación, al-Sharaa se comprometió a no formar un gabinete basado en criterios sectarios, y hay una representación geográfica más amplia que incluye ministros de Idlib y Deir ez-Zor”. Sin embargo, recalcó que “la representación por sí sola no es suficiente, ya que la eficacia es el criterio más importante”. En cuanto a la cuestión kurda, AlMustafa consideró que “no es posible esperar un acuerdo integral con la Administración Autónoma antes de formar el gobierno, ya que esto podría tardar meses, y el país no tiene el lujo de esperar”.

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English

Researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that the new government faces enormous challenges, but its formation represented a necessary and urgent step in the context of the new phase after the regime’s fall. He explained that “President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s priority is to eradicate corruption, enhance the efficiency of public administration, and restore essential services for citizens,” adding that “the majority of cabinet members are technocrats chosen based on their competence and independence, in an attempt to move beyond power-sharing and partisan loyalties.”

AlMustafa added: “Although some ministers came from the Salvation Government, al-Sharaa committed to not forming a sectarian-based cabinet, and there is broader geographical representation that includes ministers from Idlib and Deir ez-Zor.” He stressed, however, that “representation alone is not enough, as effectiveness is the most important criterion.” Regarding the Kurdish issue, AlMustafa considered that “it is not possible to wait for a comprehensive agreement with the Autonomous Administration before forming the government, as this could take months, and the country cannot afford the luxury of waiting.”

Alongside sending a message to Turkey, Israel aims through its operations to completely destroy what remains of Syria’s military infrastructure, said researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa, a military and security affairs specialist at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, in a statement to Al-Khaleej Online.

• He explained that Israel is systematically destroying the entire military infrastructure in the buffer zone, expanding in Daraa, attacking areas in Damascus countryside, and bombing Hama military airport as well as the T-4 base in Homs.
• Israel is targeting the few remaining military sites in Syria after its frenzied bombing campaign that followed Assad’s fall, making rehabilitation extremely difficult.
• Tel Aviv seeks to ensure that the Syrian army does not return to southern Syria, thereby creating a demilitarized zone.
• Currently, the diplomatic option is the one on the table for the Syrian government. This explains why the Foreign Ministry is the one commenting on events, rather than the Defense Ministry, which would normally issue statements about such developments.
• While diplomacy is possible, the military option in its general sense is not.
• However, there is the possibility of supplying some fighters from Quneitra and Daraa with short-range, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Israeli helicopters flying at accessible altitudes.
• Such a move would increase pressure on Israel and could force it to reconsider its maneuvers.
• Israel, however, may not respond to diplomatic or political pressure, as it claims to be pursuing an agenda tied to its national security.
• It is expected that Russia could step in as a mediator between Damascus and Tel Aviv, guaranteeing the borders in their previous state.
• But this would place additional pressure on the new Syrian government, as it would need to provide Russia with concessions in return for taking on such a role.
• Israel seems determined to undermine stability in the region and unsettle the new Syrian government.
• Netanyahu, meanwhile, is exporting crises abroad and continuing wars to secure political gains domestically.
• Matters appear increasingly complex, particularly as the Americans have stated they have no involvement in what is happening in Syria—an explicit denial of responsibility.
• Israeli pressure on Syria is expected to persist for a longer period, since Israel destroyed military infrastructure in Quneitra, uprooted trees, and leveled military positions entirely.
• When Israel realized there was no direct response from the Syrian administration, it began to expand in the southern region and then pushed deeper inland.
• No one knows how far Israel may go, nor is it clear whether the new Syrian administration has a plan to confront this escalation—whether diplomatically or militarily.