Research contributions, statements, and references

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa a décrit la dissolution de la Huitième Brigade comme un tournant dans le démantèlement des structures militaires parallèles dans le sud de la Syrie. Il a noté que l’assassinat de Bilal al-Droubi — qui avait l’intention de rejoindre le ministère de la Défense — a probablement déclenché cette décision, car elle a été perçue par la brigade comme une menace.

AlMustafa a souligné qu’aucun groupe armé ne sera autorisé à opérer en dehors de l’autorité du nouvel État, et il a rejeté les affirmations selon lesquelles les Émirats arabes unis auraient exercé des pressions pour cette dissolution, en pointant plutôt les dynamiques internes comme principal moteur.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa described the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade as a turning point in dismantling parallel military structures in southern Syria. He noted that the assassination of Bilal al-Droubi—who intended to join the Ministry of Defense—likely triggered the move, as it was perceived by the brigade as a threat.

AlMustafa emphasized that no armed group will be allowed to operate outside the new state’s authority, and dismissed claims that the UAE pressured for the dissolution, pointing instead to internal dynamics as the main driver.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen Almustafa estime que les premières étapes de la coordination sur le terrain entre la Turquie et Israël sont en cours afin d’éviter une confrontation et de délimiter les zones d’influence en Syrie. Il suggère qu’Ankara pourrait assumer le rôle de garant pour empêcher que le territoire syrien ne soit utilisé contre Israël.

Almustafa avertit que tout arrangement séparatiste ou tout schéma de protection externe menaçant l’unité de la Syrie constitue une ligne rouge pour la Turquie, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’administration autonome kurde. Pendant ce temps, les priorités de Washington restent centrées sur la prévention du chaos, la limitation de l’influence iranienne et la garantie d’une transition politique qui ne nuit pas à ses alliés traditionnels.

English

Researcher Muhsen Almustafa believes that initial steps of field coordination between Turkey and Israel are underway to avoid confrontation and delineate zones of influence in Syria. He suggests that Ankara could assume the role of guarantor to prevent Syrian territory from being used against Israel.

AlMustafa warns that any separatist arrangements or external protection schemes that threaten Syria’s unity are a red line for Turkey, particularly concerning the Kurdish autonomous administration. Meanwhile, Washington’s priorities remain focused on preventing chaos, curbing Iranian influence, and ensuring a political transition that does not harm its traditional allies

Spanish

El investigador Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios Estratégicos, afirmó que el nuevo gobierno enfrenta enormes desafíos, pero su formación representó un paso necesario y urgente en el contexto de la nueva etapa tras la caída del régimen. Explicó que “la prioridad del presidente Ahmad al-Sharaa es erradicar la corrupción, mejorar la eficiencia de la administración pública y restablecer los servicios básicos para los ciudadanos”, y añadió que “la mayoría de los miembros del gabinete son tecnócratas seleccionados en función de su competencia e independencia, en un intento de superar el reparto de cuotas y las lealtades partidistas”.

AlMustafa agregó: “Aunque algunos ministros pertenecían al Gobierno de Salvación, al-Sharaa se comprometió a no formar un gabinete basado en criterios sectarios, y hay una representación geográfica más amplia que incluye ministros de Idlib y Deir ez-Zor”. Sin embargo, recalcó que “la representación por sí sola no es suficiente, ya que la eficacia es el criterio más importante”. En cuanto a la cuestión kurda, AlMustafa consideró que “no es posible esperar un acuerdo integral con la Administración Autónoma antes de formar el gobierno, ya que esto podría tardar meses, y el país no tiene el lujo de esperar”.

English

Researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that the new government faces enormous challenges, but its formation represented a necessary and urgent step in the context of the new phase after the regime’s fall. He explained that “President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s priority is to eradicate corruption, enhance the efficiency of public administration, and restore essential services for citizens,” adding that “the majority of cabinet members are technocrats chosen based on their competence and independence, in an attempt to move beyond power-sharing and partisan loyalties.”

AlMustafa added: “Although some ministers came from the Salvation Government, al-Sharaa committed to not forming a sectarian-based cabinet, and there is broader geographical representation that includes ministers from Idlib and Deir ez-Zor.” He stressed, however, that “representation alone is not enough, as effectiveness is the most important criterion.” Regarding the Kurdish issue, AlMustafa considered that “it is not possible to wait for a comprehensive agreement with the Autonomous Administration before forming the government, as this could take months, and the country cannot afford the luxury of waiting.”

Alongside sending a message to Turkey, Israel aims through its operations to completely destroy what remains of Syria’s military infrastructure, said researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa, a military and security affairs specialist at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, in a statement to Al-Khaleej Online.

• He explained that Israel is systematically destroying the entire military infrastructure in the buffer zone, expanding in Daraa, attacking areas in Damascus countryside, and bombing Hama military airport as well as the T-4 base in Homs.
• Israel is targeting the few remaining military sites in Syria after its frenzied bombing campaign that followed Assad’s fall, making rehabilitation extremely difficult.
• Tel Aviv seeks to ensure that the Syrian army does not return to southern Syria, thereby creating a demilitarized zone.
• Currently, the diplomatic option is the one on the table for the Syrian government. This explains why the Foreign Ministry is the one commenting on events, rather than the Defense Ministry, which would normally issue statements about such developments.
• While diplomacy is possible, the military option in its general sense is not.
• However, there is the possibility of supplying some fighters from Quneitra and Daraa with short-range, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Israeli helicopters flying at accessible altitudes.
• Such a move would increase pressure on Israel and could force it to reconsider its maneuvers.
• Israel, however, may not respond to diplomatic or political pressure, as it claims to be pursuing an agenda tied to its national security.
• It is expected that Russia could step in as a mediator between Damascus and Tel Aviv, guaranteeing the borders in their previous state.
• But this would place additional pressure on the new Syrian government, as it would need to provide Russia with concessions in return for taking on such a role.
• Israel seems determined to undermine stability in the region and unsettle the new Syrian government.
• Netanyahu, meanwhile, is exporting crises abroad and continuing wars to secure political gains domestically.
• Matters appear increasingly complex, particularly as the Americans have stated they have no involvement in what is happening in Syria—an explicit denial of responsibility.
• Israeli pressure on Syria is expected to persist for a longer period, since Israel destroyed military infrastructure in Quneitra, uprooted trees, and leveled military positions entirely.
• When Israel realized there was no direct response from the Syrian administration, it began to expand in the southern region and then pushed deeper inland.
• No one knows how far Israel may go, nor is it clear whether the new Syrian administration has a plan to confront this escalation—whether diplomatically or militarily.

While the security situation has improved since Assad’s fall—reducing the risk of arbitrary arrests, torture, and regime bombardments—Syria remains a post-war environment,” Muhsen al-Mustafa, an Istanbul-based researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, tells Raseef22. “This means conditions are still in flux, and full stabilization will take years.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a research assistant at the Istanbul-based Omran Center for Strategic Studies, said in a phone interview Monday that while he felt the security situation in Syria was more stable now, there was still widespread “confusion” about the state of “peace inside the country.”

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa a déclaré que Miqdad al-Fatiha, un ancien officier du régime Assad, exploite le chaos post-effondrement pour échapper à la justice concernant des crimes passés, y compris des actes de brutalité contre des civils. Il a estimé que la « Brigade du Bouclier Côtier » d’al-Fatiha pourrait compter jusqu’à 4 000 combattants, mais qu’elle a perdu le soutien populaire après ses récents échecs.

AlMustafa a averti que des tensions avec des commandants alliés comme Ghiyath Dalla pourraient surgir en raison de visions contradictoires, créant ainsi des opportunités pour le gouvernement de transition de saper l’insurrection de l’intérieur.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa stated that Miqdad al-Fatiha, a former Assad regime officer, is exploiting post-collapse chaos to avoid justice for past crimes, including acts of brutality against civilians. He estimated that al-Fatiha's "Coastal Shield Brigade" may include up to 4,000 fighters but has lost popular support after recent failures. Al-Mustafa warned that tensions with allied commanders like Ghiath Dalla could emerge due to conflicting visions, creating opportunities for the transitional government to undermine the insurgency from within.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa, du Centre Omran d’études stratégiques, affirme que Ghiyath Dalla est une figure militaire de premier plan impliquée dans des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité. Selon lui, Dalla a dirigé des massacres documentés à Daraya, Mouadamiyah, Mleiha et Deraa, en plus d’avoir utilisé le siège et la famine comme armes contre les civils. Ses forces ont également été impliquées dans des pillages, des exécutions sommaires et des déplacements forcés, ce qui fait de lui l’un des plus hauts responsables militaires de certaines des pires atrocités de la guerre en Syrie.

AlMustafa explique que Dalla a combiné son expertise officielle d’officier militaire avec des réseaux de milices irrégulières apparues après 2011, ce qui a renforcé sa capacité à diriger des alliances hybrides réunissant institutions du régime et milices parallèles.

En ce qui concerne ses relations régionales, AlMustafa souligne que ses liens de longue date avec l’Iran rendent très probable qu’il ait reçu un soutien logistique et du renseignement de la part de réseaux iraniens, même s’il n’existe aucune confirmation officielle directe.

Concernant ses objectifs, AlMustafa estime que Dalla cherche à rétablir une présence militaire sur la côte syrienne, et peut-être à créer une base d’influence de facto. Une telle présence pourrait être exploitée pour solliciter une intervention régionale ou internationale en sa faveur, à l’instar de modèles d’autonomie ou de contrôle local apparus à Soueïda (à majorité druze) ou dans le nord-est de la Syrie (sous domination kurde).

AlMustafa avertit également que la présence persistante des partisans de l’ancien régime, dont la plupart sont originaires de la côte, constitue une menace sécuritaire croissante. Ils bénéficient d’avantages géographiques et sociaux dans leur environnement local, ce qui les aide à se cacher et à se réorganiser. Il a estimé que cette présence pourrait être exploitée pour former des cellules dormantes ou mener des attaques visant à déstabiliser la nouvelle Syrie, notamment en alimentant les tensions confessionnelles et régionales.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies affirms that Ghiyath Dalla is a prominent military figure involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to him, Dalla led documented massacres in Darayya, Muadamiyah, Mleiha, and Daraa, in addition to using siege and starvation as weapons against civilians. His forces were also implicated in looting, field executions, and forced displacement, making him one of the highest-ranking military officials responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the Syrian war.

AlMustafa explains that Dalla combined his official expertise as a military officer with networks of irregular militias that emerged after 2011, which strengthened his ability to lead hybrid alliances linking regime institutions with parallel militias.

Regarding his regional ties, AlMustafa points out that his long-standing connections with Iran make it highly likely that he received logistical and intelligence support from Iranian networks, even if no direct official confirmation has been given.

On his objectives, AlMustafa believes that Dalla seeks to re-establish a military presence in the Syrian coast, and possibly to create a de facto sphere of influence. Such a presence could be exploited to invite regional or international intervention on his behalf, similar to models of local autonomy or control that emerged in Sweida (predominantly Druze) or in northeastern Syria (dominated by Kurdish forces).

AlMustafa also warns that the continued presence of loyalists to the former regime, most of whom are from the coastal region, poses an escalating security threat. They benefit from geographical and social advantages in their local environment, which helps them hide and reorganize. He considered that this presence could be exploited to form sleeper cells or launch attacks aimed at destabilizing the new Syria, particularly by fueling sectarian and regional tensions.

Spanish

El investigador Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios Estratégicos, considera que el reciente ataque no fue un hecho aislado, sino un movimiento calculado de los restos de las élites del ejército y de la inteligencia de la era de Asad para mostrar de nuevo su fuerza. Opina que los enfrentamientos en curso podrían marcar el inicio de una rebelión armada coordinada por leales al antiguo régimen, que buscan recuperar su influencia y controlar zonas en la costa siria.
AlMustafa confirmó que algunos grupos indisciplinados cometieron abusos contra civiles en áreas de mayoría alauita, pero también señaló la posibilidad de que fueran los propios leales a Asad quienes perpetraran esos crímenes contra alauitas y otros partidarios de las nuevas autoridades, en cumplimiento de sus amenazas anteriores.

English

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies believes that the recent attack was not an isolated event but a calculated move by remnants of the army and intelligence elites from Assad’s era to showcase their strength once again. He considers that the ongoing clashes could mark the beginning of a coordinated armed rebellion by loyalists of the former regime, who seek to regain influence and control over areas in the Syrian coast.
AlMustafa confirmed that some undisciplined groups committed violations against civilians in predominantly Alawite areas, but he also pointed out the possibility that Assad loyalists themselves carried out those crimes against Alawites and other supporters of the new authorities, in fulfillment of their previous threats.

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies, speaking to Alhurra about the fate of senior Assad regime officers who went into hiding after the regime’s fall, said that some of these officers fled to countries such as Russia, Libya, and Iraq, or to areas controlled by the SDF, while others returned to their original regions to hide or prepare to flee later. Although they do not currently pose a major threat, he warned of the potential escalation of their danger in the future, especially in the coastal regions and the rural areas of Homs and Hama.

He noted that some security campaigns are portrayed as targeting the Alawite sect, while in reality they are directed against remnants of the former regime without sectarian or regional discrimination, warning against the use of such rhetoric to fuel divisions. AlMustafa outlined three possible scenarios for the escalation of the threat: receiving external support from regional actors such as Iran, exploiting internal security chaos, or playing on sectarian tensions in areas of former regime influence. He stressed the importance of taking strict measures, including border control, intensifying intelligence work, and strengthening national reconciliation to ensure the stability of the new Syria and prevent the return of the former regime’s influence.

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies considers that Turkey’s military expansion in Syria is no longer just speculation but concrete steps under implementation. Ankara seeks to strengthen its presence through the expansion of military bases, the increased presence of Turkish officers in training centers, and new armament programs for the new Syrian army. However, the success of this expansion depends on the extent to which regional and international powers accept this role, on reaching understandings with Russia and the United States, and on the potential challenges within Syria.

On the other hand, AlMustafa explains that Israel is concerned about any Turkish military move that could impose air protection over Syrian skies, which may restrict its freedom of military operations. Moreover, the expansion of Turkish influence could compel Tel Aviv to recalculate its strategic considerations, especially if Turkish-Russian coordination emerges to enforce new equations on the ground. Turkey’s role is not limited to the security dimension but also extends to consolidating its regional influence in a model based on protection and state-building, making it a potential alternative to Iran in Syria—reflecting Tehran’s final decline in Damascus.

Spanish

El investigador asistente Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios, afirmó que la persecución de los miembros del antiguo régimen en el ejército y en los cuerpos de seguridad se basa en su implicación en los crímenes cometidos durante la guerra, y no en su afiliación sectaria o religiosa. AlMustafa señaló: “Las nuevas autoridades no están apuntando a los alauitas, pero ellos pueden sentirse amenazados porque representaban la mayoría de las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad.” Añadió que cualquier persona que desee denunciar a un militar o a un miembro de un grupo paramilitar por supuestos crímenes debe presentar pruebas ante las nuevas autoridades.

Explicó que los alauitas – la secta islámica a la que pertenece la familia Assad – ocupaban el 88,5% de los 40 puestos más altos en el ejército sirio, y los oficiales procedentes de provincias con mayoría alauita representaban el 84% del total. En las agencias de seguridad, que desempeñaban un papel central en el régimen, los alauitas ocupaban el 65% de los cargos de liderazgo, frente al 23% de los suníes (que constituyen la mayoría de la población siria). La integración de los militares alauitas, especialmente los altos mandos, en la nueva Siria es la más complicada y problemática, ya que a su papel durante la guerra se suma el factor sectario.

También subrayó que es difícil integrar a miembros del ejército del antiguo régimen en el nuevo, salvo algunos individuos especializados, siempre que no hayan cometido crímenes contra el pueblo sirio. Señaló que es complicado determinar quién no tiene las manos manchadas de sangre, puesto que las violaciones y atrocidades se cometían en cada cuartel militar y en cada oficina de seguridad del régimen, incluso por aquellos que trabajaban en oficinas recopilando información para rastrear, vigilar y arrestar a opositores, activistas y periodistas.

English

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies affirmed that the prosecution of former regime members from the army and security forces is based on their involvement in crimes committed during the war, not on their sectarian or religious affiliation. AlMustafa stated: “The new authorities are not targeting Alawites, but they may feel threatened because they represented the majority of the armed forces and security services.” He added that anyone wishing to report a soldier or a paramilitary member for alleged crimes must present evidence to the new authorities.

He explained that the Alawites – the Islamic sect to which the Assad family belongs – held 88.5% of the top 40 positions in the Syrian army, and officers from Alawite-majority provinces represented 84% of the total. In the security agencies, which played a central role in the regime, the Alawites occupied 65% of leadership positions, compared to 23% for Sunnis (who make up the majority of Syria’s population). The integration of Alawite military personnel, especially senior leaders, into the new Syria is the most complicated and problematic, as their wartime role is compounded by the sectarian factor.

He also stressed that it is difficult to integrate members of the former regime’s army into the new one, except for some specialized individuals, provided they had not committed crimes against the Syrian people. He pointed out that it is difficult to determine who does not have blood on their hands, since violations and atrocities were committed in every military barrack and every security office of the regime, even by those working in offices who were gathering information to track, monitor, and arrest opponents, activists, and journalists.