The Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen AlMustafa, ruled out the possibility of a military clash at the current stage, noting the absence of any indications pointing to that. AlMustafa, who specializes in civil-military relations, clarified that the new administration prefers to avoid bloodshed in resolving conflicts, while keeping the military option open should peaceful solutions falter.
He pointed out that the present disputes are not merely military but also political, which makes the negotiation file complex and in need of more time to narrow the gap between the parties. He added that the main military dispute revolves around the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a principal bloc, a proposal rejected by the new administration, while the political dispute centers on the SDF’s demands for federalism, something Damascus rejects for any Syrian region.
The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explained that “the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and the army presents a major challenge for the new Syrian administration.” He told Al-Hurra that at the top of these challenges is the process of integrating the military factions into the army after their dissolution. The file of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains unresolved, especially as negotiations between the two sides continue. AlMustafa noted that the vision presented by its leader Mazloum Abdi resembles, to some extent, the situation of the Peshmerga forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, saying: “This demand is primarily rooted in ethnic reasons.”
Regarding the southern factions, he explained that their insistence on remaining as “solid blocs” stems from “their own local and regional motivations.” He does not believe that “adopting this model, based on solid blocs within the military institution, will make it more efficient; rather, it could strengthen loyalty to the faction at the expense of loyalty to the military institution as a whole.”
On the other hand, AlMustafa added that the demands to join as solid blocs do not seem to align with the vision of the new administration, which is moving toward building a professional army based on the principle of citizenship. He said this divergence could create a major challenge in resolving the issue and might even lead to future military conflict, though this is unlikely in the near term.
The national conference may compel all military factions to dissolve themselves and merge into the Ministry of Defense under the legitimacy it will acquire. The researcher added that pressure tools may also include offering political guarantees to these factions or providing temporary privileges to facilitate integration. However, “the military option remains possible if these factions refuse to comply,” AlMustafa concluded in his statement to Al-Hurra.
Commenting on Lavrov’s statements and their implications, Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said: “Lavrov does not necessarily mean Syria itself, but the presence in Syria is important for Russia and vital for its pathway into Africa in general and Libya in particular.” AlMustafa told Al-Hurra that “it cannot be said that Russia has lost its bases in Syria until the last Russian soldier leaves, but it seems that the new Syrian administration is exercising extreme caution before making any decision on this matter.”
“Several things should not be forgotten… First, Turkey has provided Russia with assurances about its influence in Syria, in return for not engaging in direct military support for Assad, in addition to political reassurance messages from the Syrian military operations command during the ‘Deterring Aggression’ battle,” AlMustafa said. He continued: “Second, Russia has a signed agreement with the Syrian state represented by the former regime, and there is no information or source indicating that this agreement was suspended after the fall of the regime, meaning it is still in effect on the ground.” At the same time, the Syrian researcher noted that “it may later be amended or canceled, depending on what the new administration sees as serving the country’s interest.”
As for the third element, AlMustafa explained: “Beyond emotions, and despite Russia’s crimes against the Syrian people and its full awareness of them—similar to other actors like Iran—it may be in Syria’s interest to maintain a good relationship with Russia and thus its bases, through re-negotiating a new agreement with it.” He justified this by saying: “It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (with veto power), and it can be useful in several vital areas necessary for rebuilding the state and possibly the army after the massive destruction it suffered. This could serve as a form of material and moral compensation for the crimes Russia committed in Syria.”
Muhsen AlMustafa, a Syrian military analyst, visiting his homeland for the first time in a decade, stated: “The foreign fighters in HTS never carried out a single terrorist attack against the US or EU. After the fall of Assad, they received promotions [inside the new security forces] from Ahmed al-Sharaa. And later, when we have a constitution, granting them Syrian citizenship will be good for everyone. They will be settled, so they don’t go and fight in other countries. The new administration cannot return them to their original countries because they would be arrested and possibly killed under torture.”
With a smile, when asked about the Uyghur fighters’ plan, he said: “Good, I think fighting China could be beneficial to the US. One day we might see US support for Turkistan to fight China, just as they did in the past when supporting the Taliban to fight the Soviet Union. Everyone who lost their homeland dreams of fighting for it. But not now – China is too strong.”
Researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa, specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, commented on the promotion decisions by saying: “It seems that the main reference relied upon by the General Command in assuming responsibility for managing the country is revolutionary legitimacy, amid an almost complete suspension of the constitution and the absence of legislative authority.”
He told Enab Baladi that with the major transformations Syria is witnessing, and for necessities interpreted by the General Command based on national interest, the new leadership has begun to take strategic decisions aimed at restructuring and developing the army and security apparatus.
According to researcher AlMustafa, the decision does not grant foreigners any commanding military status within the army but is limited to promoting them to higher military ranks. This indicates that these officers already held previous ranks, either obtained through the military leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, or as defected officers who worked within the “Deterring Aggression” operations room.
“A Síria, els membres de les forces de seguretat no tenien un carnet d’identificació normal, sinó militar. Per això, sense el nou carnet civil que reben per un període de tres mesos, no podrien moure’s pel país”, explica Muhsen AlMustafa, expert en seguretat del think tank sirià Omran Studies.
“Hi ha hagut oficials de l’exèrcit i líders de grups paramilitars que han rebutjat integrar-se i estan sent arrestats. Alguns fins i tot s’han resistit, i això ha portat a xocs violents”, comenta AlMustafa. “Jo crec que es tracta de casos de revenja personal, no crec que hi hagi una política concreta al darrere. Cal tenir present que durant la guerra es van cometre moltes massacres. El nou govern sap que la revenja contra els alauites només portaria a una nova guerra civil”, sosté AlMustafa.
English
Muhsen AlMustafa, security expert at the Syrian think tank Omran Studies, explained: “In Syria, members of the security forces did not have a normal civilian ID, but a military one. That is why, without the new civilian card they receive for a period of three months, they cannot move around the country.”
AlMustafa added: “There have been army officers and paramilitary group leaders who refused to integrate, and they are now being arrested. Some even resisted, which has led to violent clashes.” He further stated: “I believe these are cases of personal revenge, and I do not think there is a concrete policy behind them. It must be remembered that many massacres were committed during the war. The new government knows that revenge against the Alawites would only lead to another civil war.”
The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that “Israel recently took control of Mount Hermon’s peak, which stands at 2,814 meters, for strategic and security reasons, taking advantage of the security vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Assad’s army after the fall of his regime.”
He added in his statement to Al-Hurra that “Mount Hermon is considered a highly strategic site, as it provides an advanced observation point overlooking wide areas in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. This location enables Israel to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities and monitor military movements in the region.”
The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies told Al-Hurra that “from a logistical capability standpoint, it will certainly take many years. The state needs vast amounts of money to rebuild Syria’s military capacities from scratch, and it also needs countries willing to supply Syria with weapons and ensure the continuous and sustainable development of these arms.”
AlMustafa explained that “most of the weapons destroyed by Israel would not have withstood any upcoming war anyway, as most of them were scrap. Assad’s regime had not worked on developing the army for many years, even before the revolution in 2011.” He added that “in reality, rebuilding the army does not appear to be a clear priority for the new government. The priority today is to impose security, provide services, and re-establish control over all Syrian territory. However, a parallel path could be activated through preliminary steps to quietly rebuild the army. Currently, according to operations commander Ahmad al-Sharaa, the focus is on dismantling the security apparatuses. As for the old army, it has not been discussed in depth, and what has been mentioned is only in the form of hints about the military institution.”
He continued: “A few days ago, mandatory service members in the army were granted a general amnesty, along with cards ensuring they will not be stopped for the time being. Nothing has been said about the fate of the volunteers. Meanwhile, the new structure may be subject to lengthy discussions before being approved, especially since military factions are completely different from an organized army structure. A key question will later emerge: will the direction be toward building a professional army based on volunteers, or reactivating compulsory service in a different way than before?” He stressed that “priorities are different and challenges immense, especially since Assad’s regime almost completely destroyed Syria’s infrastructure, and Israel has completed the destruction of both the infrastructure and military capabilities.”
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that indicators of collapse have increased and become clear within the Syrian regime amid the rapid disintegration of its forces and its loss of control over strategic areas. AlMustafa considered that the announcement of a 50% salary increase and the calls for volunteering in auxiliary groups were merely attempts at psychological support for the collapsing army, but Assad did not have the time to rebuild the military institution.
As for the calls for volunteering and forming auxiliary groups, they were an attempt to mobilize the Alawite community through fear, and to increase the army’s core manpower to compensate for losses as quickly as possible, according to the researcher. He believes that the repeated administrative orders for ending retention over the past two years can at least be seen as premature steps taken before reaching the structure of the “professional army” that the regime was working on, as these decisions contributed to reducing the army’s manpower at a time when the regime believed it had achieved military victory.
According to Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and Syrian military expert Ismail Ayoub, the task of protecting the presidential palace is distributed among three entities. The first is the Republican Guard, the main force responsible for safeguarding Assad’s palace, established decades ago specifically to ensure his and his regime’s protection. For many years, members of the Republican Guard were carefully selected based on physical fitness, loyalty to the regime, and, in many cases, sectarian affiliation, AlMustafa explained. He noted that “the Republican Guard includes highly trained units,” but he doubts its effective strength given the battlefield realities witnessed in Syria over the past week.
The second is the 4th Armored Division. Although protecting the palace is not its formal mission, this military unit has played a major role for decades in securing the surroundings of Damascus. AlMustafa explained that “the Republican Guard and the 4th Division act as a defensive body for the presidential palace.”
The third is the Special Forces, led by General Suhail al-Hassan. These three units together are responsible for protecting the presidential palace, according to the researcher’s statement to Al-Hurra. However, he added: “It is not known whether these divisions would actually fight if Damascus’s countryside and surrounding areas fall. Where would they fight? In the cities? That depends on the outcome of the battle in Homs being led by the opposition factions.”
The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explained that the city carries “military, political, and social importance all at once.” Militarily, Homs hosts the military colleges complex, the 11th Division, the 18th Armored Division, and the command of the central region. If the armed factions managed to reach these sites, it would help them “seize larger amounts of weapons,” according to AlMustafa.
Moreover, he told Al-Hurra that Homs “includes a large support base for the Syrian regime from the Alawite community, and if its members positively receive the reassurances sent by the armed factions and remain in their neighborhoods without confrontation, the equation the regime has relied on for many years will be overturned.” AlMustafa believes that “the return of fighters and civilians to it now, after 10 years, would strike a blow to the policy adopted by the Syrian regime.”
The Syrian researcher also pointed out that armed factions’ control over Homs “would mean cutting the regime’s supply lines southward toward the coastal cities of Syria.” It would also sever all the secondary roads linking the coast with the Syrian desert, according to AlMustafa.
The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies explained that Hama represents a very strategic location for all parties involved in the Syrian conflict, especially for the armed factions currently trying to seize it. He told Al-Hurra that the city’s importance stems from its geographical position on the international M5 highway, as well as its symbolic role in the Syrian revolution, given its long history of opposing the Assad regime.
AlMustafa said: “Whoever controls the city of Hama will hold the initiative for broader military advances. The city also has an important transportation hub that facilitates large-scale military operations.” Hama connects with the Syrian desert, as well as with the Idlib countryside, and it hosts a military airport. According to the Syrian researcher, controlling it would also mean easier control over Homs than expected. He continued: “It could also spark movements in the Damascus countryside, Daraa, and Sweida to expel regime units, thereby imposing a new military reality.”
