Research contributions, statements, and references

The Erdogan–Putin agreement in Moscow on Idlib in March 2020 is considered a turning point that allowed for changes in the area of compulsory service, according to researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa, a military relations specialist at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies. He added in an interview with Al-Quds Al-Arabi that the period from mid-2023 to mid-2024 witnessed the issuance of “several administrative orders ending the retention of certain categories serving in the reserves, before, for the first time, an official discussion emerged about a plan to transform into a professional and advanced qualitative army.”

Spanish

"Hay factores domésticos", puntualiza Muhsen Al Mustafa, investigador en el Centro Omran de Estudios Estratégicos. Pese a que el conflicto llevaba años con los frentes congelados, Asad se ha apoyado en sus aliados para no tener que buscar una negociación que le solicitaban estados árabes y Turquía, al tiempo que mantenía bombardeos sobre las zonas rebeldes para "hacerlas inhabitables".

En los últimos cuatro años, desde que se firmó el alto el fuego auspiciado por Ankara y Moscú, Asad no ha mejorado la capacidad de su Ejército, especialmente frágil. "Nunca han luchado sin cobertura aérea de Rusia y sin el apoyo en el terreno de milicias chiíes como Hezbolá, las iraquíes, las paquistaníes… Los iraníes", sostiene Al Mustafa. Paralelamente, los rebeldes sí han aumentado sus capacidades, con años de entrenamiento, desarrollando armas como los drones, operaciones con visión nocturna… "Hicieron sus tareas", añade el analista sirio.

ENGLISH

“There are domestic factors,” explained Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies. Although the conflict had seen frozen frontlines for years, Assad relied on his allies to avoid negotiations requested by Arab states and Turkey, while continuing to bomb rebel-held areas to make them “uninhabitable.”

Over the last four years, since the ceasefire brokered by Ankara and Moscow, Assad has not improved the capacity of his army, which remains particularly fragile. “They have never fought without Russian air cover and without ground support from Shiite militias such as Hezbollah, the Iraqis, the Pakistanis… the Iranians,” AlMustafa noted. In parallel, the rebels have increased their capabilities through years of training, developing weapons such as drones and conducting night-vision operations. “They did their homework,” the Syrian analyst added.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies who has been following the activities and formations of the Syrian army for years, explained that “the regime appears alone in the battle. It knew that and did not resist.” He told Al-Hurra: “Its soldiers’ morale is also broken, and they knew they were alone on the battlefield without Iranian militias or Russian forces… it is noticeable that there is a collapse in the chain of command and orders.”

He added: “The current situation resembles the collapse of regime forces at the end of 2012, when they withdrew from vast areas,” noting that the balance of the conflict only tilted back in their favor after the entry of Iranian militias on the ground and the Russian intervention in 2015. AlMustafa stated that “the Syrian regime could launch a counter-offensive,” but clarified that this “needs time.” He explained: “Practically, the Syrian regime has been shocked and is now outside the battle’s calculations. It may take months if it decides to resist.”

French

« Selon Mohsen al-Moustafa, du centre de réflexion Omran Center for Strategic Studies basé à Istanbul, les rebelles syriens profitent également du contexte régional. “L’offensive constitue une réponse aux assauts répétés menés par les forces du régime et leurs milices alliées, ainsi que des frappes de drones explosifs croissantes et bombardements menés par l’Iran et le Hezbollah au cours des derniers mois dans le nord-ouest de la Syrie”, explique-t-il. »

« Le chercheur souligne que les rebelles veulent montrer leur capacité militaire et briser l’image de supériorité du régime syrien. “Leur objectif principal reste cependant défensif, en protégeant Idleb et Alep Ouest d’une éventuelle offensive d’ampleur du régime et de la Russie, similaire à celle qui avait entraîné la perte de la Ghouta orientale en 2018”, note Mohsen al-Moustafa. »

English

According to Muhsen AlMustafa, researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul, Syrian opposition factions are also taking advantage of the regional context. He explains: “The offensive constitutes a response to repeated assaults carried out by regime forces and their allied militias, as well as to the increasing explosive drone strikes and bombardments conducted by Iran and Hezbollah over the past months in northwestern Syria.”

The researcher stresses that the rebels want to demonstrate their military capabilities and break the image of the regime’s superiority. He adds: “Their main objective, however, remains defensive, by protecting Idlib and western Aleppo from a possible large-scale offensive by the regime and Russia, similar to the one that led to the fall of Eastern Ghouta in 2018.”

The Syrian researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, on the other hand, stated that the regime has “been able throughout the past year and until now to distance itself from the battle.” He told
Al-Hurra: “It has not and does not want to intervene because it knows the consequences of such intervention given Israel’s intense aggressiveness.”

Contrary to the prevailing belief of a Syrian-Iranian rift, Iran itself may have told the regime not to intervene, according to AlMustafa. He explained that this may be related to ensuring that it “does not lose the gains it has achieved over the past years… thus allowing the Iranian presence in Syria to last longer.”

French

Le chercheur au Centre Omran for Strategic Studies, Mohsen al-Moustafa, souligne que la nomination d’un Premier ministre syrien placé sous sanctions européennes est avant tout un message politique. Selon lui, le régime veut montrer qu’il n’est pas disposé à faire des concessions ni à modifier son comportement en échange d’une levée des sanctions ou d’un retour sur la scène internationale.

Al-Moustafa rappelle que, conformément aux articles 97 et 98 de la Constitution de 2012, le poste de Premier ministre est dépourvu de tout pouvoir décisionnel réel. Son rôle se limite à l’exécution des directives du président et à la gestion administrative du gouvernement, tandis que le centre du pouvoir demeure entièrement entre les mains de Bachar al-Assad.

Ainsi, la nomination de Mohammad Ghazi Jalali ne change rien à la structure du régime en place. Elle consacre plutôt la centralisation continue du pouvoir entre les mains de la présidence et reflète la volonté du régime de maintenir le statu quo malgré les pressions internationales.

Englsih

Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen AlMustafa, points out that the appointment of a Syrian Prime Minister under European sanctions is above all a political message. In his view, the regime seeks to demonstrate that it is unwilling to make concessions or change its behavior in exchange for the lifting of sanctions or its reintegration into the international arena.

AlMustafa recalls that, according to Articles 97 and 98 of the 2012 Constitution, the office of Prime Minister lacks any real decision-making power. His role is limited to executing the president’s directives and managing the government’s administrative affairs, while the center of power remains entirely in the hands of Bashar al-Assad.

Therefore, the appointment of Mohammad Ghazi Jalali brings no change to the structure of the existing regime. Instead, it reinforces the continued concentration of power in the presidency and reflects the regime’s desire to preserve the status quo despite international pressure.

According to Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, the Syrian regime is seeking to attract volunteers in order to “form a solid bloc within the army.” This “solid bloc” relies on volunteers who demonstrate greater loyalty to the regime compared to conscripts serving under compulsory service, who are seen as less reliable due to social and sectarian divisions, he told Al-Hurra.

He added that “the demobilization of groups from reserve and compulsory service is part of this strategy to ease burdens on certain civilian sectors,” and also “an attempt to reduce waves of asylum as many young people migrate to escape prolonged service, in addition to other reasons for displacement and migration.” While the exact future form of that “army” is still unclear, AlMustafa believes the goal is to “create a military force composed of individuals with stronger loyalty, higher skills, and attractive financial benefits, allowing the regime to reinforce its military and security grip more effectively.”

AlMustafa explained that “the term professional army is far too big for Assad’s army.” He noted that “the core criterion within it is loyalty, not professionalism, although the term ‘professional’ is usually applied to volunteer-based armies.” Nonetheless, this does not mean the regime’s future army “will not train or adopt new tactics, but it will fall far short of confronting an organized military force or another army, while maintaining a high destructive effectiveness against the Syrian people,” the researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies concluded.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, explained to Enab Baladi that the amendments introduced by the decree did not address the age of reserve military service itself, but rather paragraph “W,” which allowed those paying the financial substitute (whether enlisted or not) to pay $4,800 or its equivalent in Syrian pounds, with a reduction of $200 for each month of service performed by the enlisted person. Paragraph “W” had been added under Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023.

The researcher interpreted the addition of Decree No. 20, which introduced the option of paying a reserve service substitute for disabled individuals (set at $3,000), as consistent with the regime’s current effort to present itself as offering more “care” to citizens with disabilities, by allowing them to pay a lower substitute than that stated in paragraph “W” of Article 26. It also expands the age group eligible to pay the substitute, meaning greater financial gains for the regime.

According to an analytical article published by Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies on August 6, titled “Syria’s Reserve Military Service Transformations and Objectives”, the plan regarding reserve service is driven by an attempt to ease the burden on social groups within regime-controlled areas, especially after large waves of migration, of which reserve service has been one of the main causes, aside from other economic or social reasons.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that the main objective of this campaign is to recover the looted funds from the party’s financial allocations and resources, after many years of rampant corruption inside the central leadership of the party. He told Syria TV: “It seems that Bashar al-Assad has granted the new deputy secretary-general, Ibrahim al-Hadid, the authority and green light to carry out the investigation, in an attempt to reclaim the stolen funds.”

AlMustafa stressed that the regime seeks through this campaign to portray the party as a transparent institution subject to oversight and evaluation, which strengthens the image of the regime’s government and state institutions in fighting corruption. On whether the anti-corruption campaign is a preemptive step to address internal or external pressures, AlMustafa pointed out that it is not the result of direct internal or external pressure on the party, but stems from Assad’s approach toward tighter control and oversight within it.

He explained: “This campaign is a message to the new members that they are under surveillance and subject to accountability at any time, thereby creating a constant state of apprehension that forces them to work more strictly.” He predicted that the campaign could expand to include all state institutions, with the possibility of appointing a new government within the next two months.

AlMustafa considered that there is a strong connection between exposing corruption and changes in the party leadership. He said: “The investigation came only three months after the formation of a new central leadership of the party. Without this entirely new leadership, corruption could not have been exposed.” He added that the old financially corrupt leadership would never have revealed the violations it committed but would instead have concealed the traces of its corruption.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that the regime began about three years ago to demobilize a number of conscripts after they had spent years in reserve service.

He continued that the regime’s plan began to take shape about a year ago through issuing administrative orders to demobilize more reservists, in addition to the announcement by Major General Ahmad Suleiman, the director general of the General Administration at the Ministry of Defense in the regime’s government, about the intention to close the reserve service file and build a “professional army” based on volunteers.

AlMustafa pointed out that the regime’s current goal focuses on rebuilding the necessary human resources for the army primarily from volunteers, with the later aim of reducing reliance on conscripts, whether through mandatory or reserve service. The researcher noted that this step came because the regime realized, after years of the Syrian uprising, that those in compulsory service cannot be heavily relied upon due to the many defections and the widespread reluctance to join the army.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, explained the phrase in the last clause to mean that anyone who meets the conditions listed at the end of the third clause will not need a new administrative order to be covered by the demobilization decision.

He told Enab Baladi that the other clauses of the administrative order did not make much difference in terms of details, since the reserve officers in the regime’s army are mostly holders of advanced degrees or university majors requiring five years of study, and therefore their numbers are not significantly large.

The researcher linked the latest administrative order to the changes that began to appear in the regime’s military institution since last year, pointing to the trend toward creating a “professional army” and addressing the issue of reserve service, which has been a major reason behind the migration of young people from regime-held areas. According to AlMustafa, the third clause of this order complements Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023, which allowed those liable for reserve service over the age of 40 to pay a financial substitute to avoid serving in the reserves.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Noon Post that this represents “a shared interest and an additional link between the regime and these individuals, which opens a new door for corruption,” stressing that granting these leaders immunity for four years provides them with protection from illicit gains, from which security agency leaders will also benefit.

AlMustafa considered that militia leaders are seeking to expand their roles and increase their influence to new levels within civil institutions, after their roles were deeper in the military and security domains. He emphasized that these positions are “an opportunity to broaden their networks and connections, and thus their ability to continue either through armed force in the past, or now through official office.”

He added that after amassing huge sums of money through shabbiha practices, “tarfiq” (militia members escorting commercial trucks to impose levies under the pretext of protecting them from terrorists), blackmail, and other activities, these individuals now aspire to higher social status derived from official positions. Moreover, the regime could not find better representatives than them, especially since most are members of the Baath Party, according to AlMustafa.