Research contributions, statements, and references

Spanish

“Los sirios aquí son beneficiarios de un permiso de residencia temporal que les permite trabajar y acceder a los servicios públicos, como la sanidad y la educación. Pero no gozan del estatuto de refugiados reconocido en las convenciones internacionales”, explica Muhsen alMustafá, un investigador sirio del think tank Omran, basado en Estambul y creado por miembros de la oposición siria. Por esta razón, la comunidad sigue con preocupación el tono que ha adoptado la campaña de las elecciones presidenciales, sobre todo de cara a la segunda vuelta, que se celebrará el próximo domingo 28 de mayo.

En un contexto de crisis económica aguda, con la inflación oficial alrededor del 50% tras llegar al 85%, los refugiados sirios se han convertido en un caso de construcción de un chivo expiatorio de manual. “Los exiliados no son los culpables de la espiral inflacionaria en Turquía. Al contrario, contribuyen de forma positiva a la economía”, sostiene al Mustafá y recuerda que la mayoría de los refugiados lleva unos diez años en el país, pero la inflación solo se disparó en los últimos dos años como consecuencia de la guerra de Ucrania y las heterodoxas políticas monetarias del presidente Erdogan.

English

“Syrians here are beneficiaries of a temporary residence permit that allows them to work and access public services such as healthcare and education. But they do not enjoy refugee status as recognized in international conventions,” explained Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Istanbul-based Omran think tank, founded by members of the Syrian opposition. For this reason, the community is following with concern the tone adopted in the presidential election campaign, especially ahead of the runoff scheduled for Sunday, May 28.

In the context of a severe economic crisis, with official inflation around 50% after having reached 85%, Syrian refugees have become a textbook case of scapegoating. “Exiles are not to blame for the inflationary spiral in Turkey. On the contrary, they contribute positively to the economy,” AlMustafa argued, recalling that most refugees have been in the country for about ten years, but inflation only skyrocketed in the last two years as a consequence of the war in Ukraine and President Erdogan’s unorthodox monetary policies.

Dutch

English

Now that Assad has discovered how important it is to them to stop the drugs trade to their countries, he can blackmail them with it. And he will, again and again, to try and get more benefits from them

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and a former non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, expects Erdogan’s current policy to continue if he wins the elections, noting that “voluntary return operations may increase due to the economic crisis and the repercussions of the earthquake,” as he told Syria Direct.

AlMustafa believes that Kilicdaroglu’s talk about withdrawing from Syria is merely electoral promises and does not represent a real political plan, saying: “They make promises for the sake of elections, and when one of them comes to power, they will face reality,” pointing out that “the army and intelligence will not accept losing these advantages derived from military operations; it is a matter of national security.”

French

Croyez-moi, si je pouvais rentrer en Syrie, je le ferais

English

Provide statements on the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon

Los sirios temen más al hambre que a las bombas

Spanish

No se puede obviar el factor político en un conflicto como el de Siria, en el que el presidente El Asad “ha castigado a toda la población por rebelarse contra él hace 12 años”, tal y como declara Muhsen alMustafa, analista asociado al centro de análisis Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) de Washington.

“En concreto, las poblaciones rurales y agrícolas fueron importantes propulsores de la revolución, a diferencia de las áreas progubernamentales”, explica el experto sirio. “A eso se añade que muchos ciudadanos se han visto desplazados por la represión del régimen y los ataques terrestres y aéreos indiscriminados sobre sus localidades, incluidas las tierras de cultivo”, de las cuales obtenía algún tipo de sustento cerca del 50% de la población.

“La escasez de combustible en la pasada década también ha afectado mucho a la agricultura”, agrega AlMustafa, quien considera que el Gobierno de El Asad no cuenta en la actualidad con los medios ni con el personal técnico para relanzar el sector, aparte de “la corrupción que afecta a todas las administraciones públicas”. Y aclara que “lo más importante para el régimen era mantenerse en el poder. Por ello, ha descuidado todas las áreas de desarrollo del país”, concluye.

Engliah

One cannot overlook the political factor in a conflict like Syria, where President Assad “has punished the entire population for rebelling against him 12 years ago,” as stated by Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant affiliated with the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) in Washington.

The Syrian expert explained that “rural and agricultural communities were key drivers of the revolution, unlike the pro-government areas.” He added that “many citizens have been displaced by the regime’s repression and by indiscriminate ground and air attacks on their towns, including farmland,” from which nearly 50% of the population used to secure some form of livelihood.

AlMustafa noted that “the fuel shortage over the past decade has also deeply affected agriculture,” considering that Assad’s government currently lacks both the resources and the technical staff to revive the sector, in addition to “the corruption that plagues all public administrations.” He emphasized that “the most important thing for the regime was to remain in power; therefore, it neglected all areas of the country’s development,” he concluded.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and a fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that “the head of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, Hossam Louka, has three children: Nouri, Natasha, and Satanay. While Nouri is pursuing graduate studies in Russia, Natasha completed her studies in pharmacy and married the son of Ibrahim Othman, head of the Atomic Energy Commission of the Syrian regime. As for Satanay, she studied at the Higher Institute of Business Administration in Damascus.” AlMustafa suggested that she is likely to be employed at a United Nations office.

He explained that “employment in the UN office where Louka’s daughter works is secured through recommendations from influential individuals and via informal networks within the UN in Damascus,” adding that “other applicants may even be intimidated so that the candidate favored by the Syrian regime ultimately takes the position.” AlMustafa stressed that “having employees in UN offices who are close to the regime or related to its leaders is nothing new; while such employment might be legally sound, it contradicts the values the UN claims to represent.”

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, pointed out the concentration of the Syrian regime forces’ activity in the period immediately following the earthquake. At the official level, the “army” took part in rescue operations and rubble removal, while military hospitals received civilian casualties for treatment.

The “army clubs” also hosted a number of families, without it being clear whether they were relatives of military personnel or civilians, while the security forces under the Ministry of Interior were mobilized in response to the earthquake, though without a clear role in relief operations such as distributing aid, providing shelter, medical care, and other services.

German:

Muhsen al-Mustafa, Forscher am 'Omran Center for Strategic Studies' in Istanbul, sagt "Da die Rückkehrer größtenteils nicht in die vom Assad-Regime kontrollierten Gebiete zurückkehren, haben sie keine Angst vor Verfolgung oder Verhaftung durch die Sicherheitskräfte der Regierung"

Die größte Bedrohung gehe aber nach wie vor von Machthaber Baschar al-Assad aus, der sie daran hindern würde, in die Gebiete zurückzukehren, aus denen sie ursprünglich kommen. "Wenn sie jedoch die von der Opposition gehaltenen Gebiete nicht verlassen, besteht die größte Gefahr für sie darin, vom Assads Waffen getroffen zu werden", so al-Mustafa.

English

Muhsen alMustafa, a researcher at the Istanbul-based Omran Center for Strategic Studies.said "Because the returnees are mostly not going back into areas controlled by the Assad regime, they have no fear of pursuit or arrest by government security forces,".

"The biggest threat is still Bashar Assad, who would prevent them from returning to the areas they originally came from [elsewhere in Syria] either because the area has been destroyed, or because of further government oppression and persecution. But if they don't go any further than opposition-held areas, then the most likely danger for them would be shelling carried out by Assad's army from time to time," alMustafa said.

The researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), Muhsen AlMustafa, told Enab Baladi that the targeting operations are confined to three warring parties: the opposition, the regime, and fighters of the Islamic State organization in southern Syria.
He considered that the continuation of these targeting operations in the governorate is evidence of the “security failure” of the regime’s agencies and forces there. As for benefit and harm, the researcher explained that the regime does not view human losses as a measure of benefit or harm; what matters to it is controlling the land and imposing its authority over it, regardless of the number of dead from any side, including its own forces.

The researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Muhsen AlMustafa, believes that the “tactical operational projects” that the Syrian regime has been announcing repeatedly aim to “maintain combat readiness, especially since military operations have decreased, and therefore new soldiers must be brought into the battle atmosphere.”

AlMustafa told Al-Hurra: “At the beginning of the revolution, Syrian soldiers did not always carry weapons. But now the situation is different.” Although “Russia is constantly monitoring and present,” the decision to carry out these maneuvers comes from “the Syrian regime’s leadership, while the Russian side’s role is limited to monitoring performance.” Considering that Maher Al-Assad, Bashar’s brother, appeared for the first time in “military uniform” and in training, the researcher explained: “He is a division commander, and his presence is ordinary. We should not place him in an ivory tower,” as he put it.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, considered that the aim of Legislative Decree No. 16 of 2022, which stipulates the acceptance of doctors as obligated to public service for ten years including military service, is to try to benefit as much as possible from these doctors, especially since it is applied for the first time to a civilian sector, while previously it was in the police sector when a volunteer served five years in order to waive mandatory service.

AlMustafa, who is also a non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (timep), pointed out that the salary will be “the salary of the contracting institution, which here is a civilian body, and the doctor will receive the salary corresponding to his academic degree according to the recognized salary scale, and the Basic Law of State Employees will apply to him.” He also considered that doctors would prefer to emigrate outside Syria due to the large financial returns, in addition to the fact that many doctors are unwilling to take such jobs in the government sector, for a period of ten years.

The assistant researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (Timep), Muhsen AlMustafa, explained in an interview with Enab Baladi that the decision related to military service is “closely” tied to the regime’s attempt to curb the migration of skilled professionals. He cited Decree No. 16, which the regime’s president issued two days after the decision, accepting a number of medical students and medical degree holders as obligated to serve in public institutions.
He also believes that the Syrian regime is trying to limit the migration of doctors not only because of the shortage in medical staff, but also because, from the regime’s perspective, a medical student studying in Syrian universities for more than six years and then emigrating to work abroad constitutes a “financial loss.”