Research contributions, statements, and references

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa, du Centre Omran d’études stratégiques, affirme que Ghiyath Dalla est une figure militaire de premier plan impliquée dans des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité. Selon lui, Dalla a dirigé des massacres documentés à Daraya, Mouadamiyah, Mleiha et Deraa, en plus d’avoir utilisé le siège et la famine comme armes contre les civils. Ses forces ont également été impliquées dans des pillages, des exécutions sommaires et des déplacements forcés, ce qui fait de lui l’un des plus hauts responsables militaires de certaines des pires atrocités de la guerre en Syrie.

AlMustafa explique que Dalla a combiné son expertise officielle d’officier militaire avec des réseaux de milices irrégulières apparues après 2011, ce qui a renforcé sa capacité à diriger des alliances hybrides réunissant institutions du régime et milices parallèles.

En ce qui concerne ses relations régionales, AlMustafa souligne que ses liens de longue date avec l’Iran rendent très probable qu’il ait reçu un soutien logistique et du renseignement de la part de réseaux iraniens, même s’il n’existe aucune confirmation officielle directe.

Concernant ses objectifs, AlMustafa estime que Dalla cherche à rétablir une présence militaire sur la côte syrienne, et peut-être à créer une base d’influence de facto. Une telle présence pourrait être exploitée pour solliciter une intervention régionale ou internationale en sa faveur, à l’instar de modèles d’autonomie ou de contrôle local apparus à Soueïda (à majorité druze) ou dans le nord-est de la Syrie (sous domination kurde).

AlMustafa avertit également que la présence persistante des partisans de l’ancien régime, dont la plupart sont originaires de la côte, constitue une menace sécuritaire croissante. Ils bénéficient d’avantages géographiques et sociaux dans leur environnement local, ce qui les aide à se cacher et à se réorganiser. Il a estimé que cette présence pourrait être exploitée pour former des cellules dormantes ou mener des attaques visant à déstabiliser la nouvelle Syrie, notamment en alimentant les tensions confessionnelles et régionales.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies affirms that Ghiyath Dalla is a prominent military figure involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to him, Dalla led documented massacres in Darayya, Muadamiyah, Mleiha, and Daraa, in addition to using siege and starvation as weapons against civilians. His forces were also implicated in looting, field executions, and forced displacement, making him one of the highest-ranking military officials responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the Syrian war.

AlMustafa explains that Dalla combined his official expertise as a military officer with networks of irregular militias that emerged after 2011, which strengthened his ability to lead hybrid alliances linking regime institutions with parallel militias.

Regarding his regional ties, AlMustafa points out that his long-standing connections with Iran make it highly likely that he received logistical and intelligence support from Iranian networks, even if no direct official confirmation has been given.

On his objectives, AlMustafa believes that Dalla seeks to re-establish a military presence in the Syrian coast, and possibly to create a de facto sphere of influence. Such a presence could be exploited to invite regional or international intervention on his behalf, similar to models of local autonomy or control that emerged in Sweida (predominantly Druze) or in northeastern Syria (dominated by Kurdish forces).

AlMustafa also warns that the continued presence of loyalists to the former regime, most of whom are from the coastal region, poses an escalating security threat. They benefit from geographical and social advantages in their local environment, which helps them hide and reorganize. He considered that this presence could be exploited to form sleeper cells or launch attacks aimed at destabilizing the new Syria, particularly by fueling sectarian and regional tensions.

Spanish

El investigador Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios Estratégicos, considera que el reciente ataque no fue un hecho aislado, sino un movimiento calculado de los restos de las élites del ejército y de la inteligencia de la era de Asad para mostrar de nuevo su fuerza. Opina que los enfrentamientos en curso podrían marcar el inicio de una rebelión armada coordinada por leales al antiguo régimen, que buscan recuperar su influencia y controlar zonas en la costa siria.
AlMustafa confirmó que algunos grupos indisciplinados cometieron abusos contra civiles en áreas de mayoría alauita, pero también señaló la posibilidad de que fueran los propios leales a Asad quienes perpetraran esos crímenes contra alauitas y otros partidarios de las nuevas autoridades, en cumplimiento de sus amenazas anteriores.

English

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies believes that the recent attack was not an isolated event but a calculated move by remnants of the army and intelligence elites from Assad’s era to showcase their strength once again. He considers that the ongoing clashes could mark the beginning of a coordinated armed rebellion by loyalists of the former regime, who seek to regain influence and control over areas in the Syrian coast.
AlMustafa confirmed that some undisciplined groups committed violations against civilians in predominantly Alawite areas, but he also pointed out the possibility that Assad loyalists themselves carried out those crimes against Alawites and other supporters of the new authorities, in fulfillment of their previous threats.

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies, speaking to Alhurra about the fate of senior Assad regime officers who went into hiding after the regime’s fall, said that some of these officers fled to countries such as Russia, Libya, and Iraq, or to areas controlled by the SDF, while others returned to their original regions to hide or prepare to flee later. Although they do not currently pose a major threat, he warned of the potential escalation of their danger in the future, especially in the coastal regions and the rural areas of Homs and Hama.

He noted that some security campaigns are portrayed as targeting the Alawite sect, while in reality they are directed against remnants of the former regime without sectarian or regional discrimination, warning against the use of such rhetoric to fuel divisions. AlMustafa outlined three possible scenarios for the escalation of the threat: receiving external support from regional actors such as Iran, exploiting internal security chaos, or playing on sectarian tensions in areas of former regime influence. He stressed the importance of taking strict measures, including border control, intensifying intelligence work, and strengthening national reconciliation to ensure the stability of the new Syria and prevent the return of the former regime’s influence.

The study by Hamza Rustanawi and Ahmad Mouloud al-Tayyar cites Brothers in Arms and Power Centers in the Syrian Army on page 23 in its discussion of military structures. Baath Democracy is also listed in the bibliography on page 106.

Referenced works: Brothers in Arms؛ Power Centers in the Syrian Army 2020:A Sectarian Approach؛ ديمقراطية البعث.. انتخابات 2020 ومقاربات تكريس المادة الثامنة.

This ACCORD query response, published on 24 February 2025, examines self-defence duty in North and East Syria, including possible legal changes, penalties, recruitment in Deir ez-Zor, mobilisation and combat deployment. It draws on an email provided by Muhsen AlMustafa on 18 February, reporting that the situation regarding self-defence service had remained unchanged at that point. His contribution also addressed desertions recorded within the Syrian Democratic Forces after the fall of the Assad government, including personnel performing self-defence duty.

The report quotes Muhsen ALMustafa on the decline of Egypt’s regional role since Hosni Mubarak’s fall, in explaining Saudi Arabia’s rise as an influential diplomatic hub.

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies considers that Turkey’s military expansion in Syria is no longer just speculation but concrete steps under implementation. Ankara seeks to strengthen its presence through the expansion of military bases, the increased presence of Turkish officers in training centers, and new armament programs for the new Syrian army. However, the success of this expansion depends on the extent to which regional and international powers accept this role, on reaching understandings with Russia and the United States, and on the potential challenges within Syria.

On the other hand, AlMustafa explains that Israel is concerned about any Turkish military move that could impose air protection over Syrian skies, which may restrict its freedom of military operations. Moreover, the expansion of Turkish influence could compel Tel Aviv to recalculate its strategic considerations, especially if Turkish-Russian coordination emerges to enforce new equations on the ground. Turkey’s role is not limited to the security dimension but also extends to consolidating its regional influence in a model based on protection and state-building, making it a potential alternative to Iran in Syria—reflecting Tehran’s final decline in Damascus.

The study draws on “The Selective Return of Syrian Refugees” to examine selective readmission, the preference for return to rural areas, risks to property, and the absence of security guarantees.

Spanish

El investigador asistente Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios, afirmó que la persecución de los miembros del antiguo régimen en el ejército y en los cuerpos de seguridad se basa en su implicación en los crímenes cometidos durante la guerra, y no en su afiliación sectaria o religiosa. AlMustafa señaló: “Las nuevas autoridades no están apuntando a los alauitas, pero ellos pueden sentirse amenazados porque representaban la mayoría de las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad.” Añadió que cualquier persona que desee denunciar a un militar o a un miembro de un grupo paramilitar por supuestos crímenes debe presentar pruebas ante las nuevas autoridades.

Explicó que los alauitas – la secta islámica a la que pertenece la familia Assad – ocupaban el 88,5% de los 40 puestos más altos en el ejército sirio, y los oficiales procedentes de provincias con mayoría alauita representaban el 84% del total. En las agencias de seguridad, que desempeñaban un papel central en el régimen, los alauitas ocupaban el 65% de los cargos de liderazgo, frente al 23% de los suníes (que constituyen la mayoría de la población siria). La integración de los militares alauitas, especialmente los altos mandos, en la nueva Siria es la más complicada y problemática, ya que a su papel durante la guerra se suma el factor sectario.

También subrayó que es difícil integrar a miembros del ejército del antiguo régimen en el nuevo, salvo algunos individuos especializados, siempre que no hayan cometido crímenes contra el pueblo sirio. Señaló que es complicado determinar quién no tiene las manos manchadas de sangre, puesto que las violaciones y atrocidades se cometían en cada cuartel militar y en cada oficina de seguridad del régimen, incluso por aquellos que trabajaban en oficinas recopilando información para rastrear, vigilar y arrestar a opositores, activistas y periodistas.

English

The Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Studies affirmed that the prosecution of former regime members from the army and security forces is based on their involvement in crimes committed during the war, not on their sectarian or religious affiliation. AlMustafa stated: “The new authorities are not targeting Alawites, but they may feel threatened because they represented the majority of the armed forces and security services.” He added that anyone wishing to report a soldier or a paramilitary member for alleged crimes must present evidence to the new authorities.

He explained that the Alawites – the Islamic sect to which the Assad family belongs – held 88.5% of the top 40 positions in the Syrian army, and officers from Alawite-majority provinces represented 84% of the total. In the security agencies, which played a central role in the regime, the Alawites occupied 65% of leadership positions, compared to 23% for Sunnis (who make up the majority of Syria’s population). The integration of Alawite military personnel, especially senior leaders, into the new Syria is the most complicated and problematic, as their wartime role is compounded by the sectarian factor.

He also stressed that it is difficult to integrate members of the former regime’s army into the new one, except for some specialized individuals, provided they had not committed crimes against the Syrian people. He pointed out that it is difficult to determine who does not have blood on their hands, since violations and atrocities were committed in every military barrack and every security office of the regime, even by those working in offices who were gathering information to track, monitor, and arrest opponents, activists, and journalists.

The Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen AlMustafa, ruled out the possibility of a military clash at the current stage, noting the absence of any indications pointing to that. AlMustafa, who specializes in civil-military relations, clarified that the new administration prefers to avoid bloodshed in resolving conflicts, while keeping the military option open should peaceful solutions falter.

He pointed out that the present disputes are not merely military but also political, which makes the negotiation file complex and in need of more time to narrow the gap between the parties. He added that the main military dispute revolves around the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a principal bloc, a proposal rejected by the new administration, while the political dispute centers on the SDF’s demands for federalism, something Damascus rejects for any Syrian region.

Syrian Today covered telecom companies’ responses to the Syria TV investigation into Iranian SIM cards. It reported MTN’s denial of dealings with the Iranian company and Syriatel’s explanation that it had contracted with that supplier in 2021 and sent samples for testing.

Cited work: أحصنة طروادة في هواتف السوريين.. شرائح الاتصال في سوريا إيرانية الصنع.

Shaam News Network followed up on the Syria TV investigation into Iranian SIM cards, reporting the communications ministry’s announcement that samples had been sent for safety testing. It also included Syriatel’s explanation of its supplier arrangements and testing, alongside MTN’s denial of using Iranian SIM cards.

Cited work: أحصنة طروادة في هواتف السوريين.. شرائح الاتصال في سوريا إيرانية الصنع.