Issue 23/2025 of SWP’s Middle East and North Africa Web Monitor lists the Arabic article “الجريدة الرسمية والنشر.. سوريا الجديدة ما بين السرية والشفافية” on page 14, in the section on Syria’s transition and reconstruction. The title and source link form a bibliographic entry, not an analytical endorsement of the article.
Published by ACCORD on 25 March 2025, this query response examines recruitment practices of Syria’s transitional government and other armed groups, including forced recruitment. Its discussion of status-settlement cards refers readers to “Syria: Humanitarian situation; Questions related to military service, especially in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA),” the webinar documentation published on 19 December 2024, for further information about status settlement under the Assad government.
While the security situation has improved since Assad’s fall—reducing the risk of arbitrary arrests, torture, and regime bombardments—Syria remains a post-war environment,” Muhsen al-Mustafa, an Istanbul-based researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, tells Raseef22. “This means conditions are still in flux, and full stabilization will take years.
The EUAA report cites previously published input in ACCORD’s documentation of the 24 October 2024 webinar when discussing child recruitment in northeastern Syria. The citation appears in footnote 304 on page 40, with the webinar documentation listed in the bibliography.
The report uses previously published data on the release of reservists and officers, alongside findings from Omran’s 2020 study of military leadership posts, in its discussion of the collapse of Assad’s forces.
Muhsen AlMustafa believes that the nature of the proposed security changes in Syria is still unclear, as it has not yet been decided who will lead the new security apparatus if the Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are merged. He points out that the regime will try to streamline the overlapping branches of the two agencies while keeping the non-overlapping ones, but he recalls that previous restructuring attempts failed due to the complexity and deep interconnections within the security apparatus.
He stresses that Russia has greater influence than Iran over the Syrian security services, making it a likely party behind such changes, especially given the existence of four agencies with overlapping, competing roles. In his view, any restructuring could carry a political dimension within the framework of international understandings and fall under Moscow’s attempts to reshape the security system to serve its interests.
He also argues that these changes may aim to obscure the crimes and violations committed by the security branches, but they will not succeed in deceiving international human rights bodies. Instead, they may make accountability more complicated, as international organizations would need to determine which new branch inherits the record of violations, thereby prolonging the accountability process without changing the essence of the existing security structure.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a research assistant at the Istanbul-based Omran Center for Strategic Studies, said in a phone interview Monday that while he felt the security situation in Syria was more stable now, there was still widespread “confusion” about the state of “peace inside the country.”
The SCM report cites “Fight or Flight: The Syrian Conscription Nightmare” in its discussion of conscription in areas outside the former government’s control and its role among the pressures prompting flight.
Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa a déclaré que Miqdad al-Fatiha, un ancien officier du régime Assad, exploite le chaos post-effondrement pour échapper à la justice concernant des crimes passés, y compris des actes de brutalité contre des civils. Il a estimé que la « Brigade du Bouclier Côtier » d’al-Fatiha pourrait compter jusqu’à 4 000 combattants, mais qu’elle a perdu le soutien populaire après ses récents échecs.
AlMustafa a averti que des tensions avec des commandants alliés comme Ghiyath Dalla pourraient surgir en raison de visions contradictoires, créant ainsi des opportunités pour le gouvernement de transition de saper l’insurrection de l’intérieur.
Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa stated that Miqdad al-Fatiha, a former Assad regime officer, is exploiting post-collapse chaos to avoid justice for past crimes, including acts of brutality against civilians. He estimated that al-Fatiha's "Coastal Shield Brigade" may include up to 4,000 fighters but has lost popular support after recent failures. Al-Mustafa warned that tensions with allied commanders like Ghiath Dalla could emerge due to conflicting visions, creating opportunities for the transitional government to undermine the insurgency from within.
The report draws on “Syrian Amnesty Decree 27: Old Policy, No Progress” in discussing the amnesty’s scope and the continued exclusion of political detainees.
Farah Abu Ayadeh’s article on Syrian refugees’ return from Jordan cites an interview with Muhsen al-Mustafa conducted on 8 August 2024. Note 4 supports the discussion of economic and security-related reasons for displacement.
