Research contributions, statements, and references

Muhsen AlMustafa, researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, says that the benefits for Damascus are very significant; supporting countries will be able to deal with Syrian state institutions “without reservation,” including financial support, aid, and investments, in addition to contributing to the lifting of sanctions on the Central Bank of Syria.

AlMustafa also believes that European countries will follow the United States in the path of lifting sanctions imposed on Syria, noting that there are undoubtedly technical obstacles at present, especially related to legislation, but that these will fade over time.

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, specializing in military and security affairs, told Enab Baladi that the Syrian state’s capacity to control weapons “appears good so far,” despite field complexities, noting that the general trend is moving toward restricting weapons to the state’s hands. He considered that the state has gradual tools to move forward, including integration programs, reconciliations, and incentives to join the military and internal security institutions, predicting the adoption of a new weapons possession law after the activation of the People’s Assembly, in line with the requirements of the phase.

He saw that the current focus on areas that were outside control or loyal to the former regime is natural given the nature of the security risks there, compared with temporary and less prioritized tolerance in traditional stronghold areas. He concluded that controlling weapons is a cornerstone for building the rule of law, consolidating decision-making centrality, ending parallel power phenomena, enhancing the state’s prestige, reducing local conflicts, and creating a safe environment for recovery, the return of displaced persons, and the launch of development.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen AlMustafa a décrit la dissolution de la Huitième Brigade comme un tournant dans le démantèlement des structures militaires parallèles dans le sud de la Syrie. Il a noté que l’assassinat de Bilal al-Droubi — qui avait l’intention de rejoindre le ministère de la Défense — a probablement déclenché cette décision, car elle a été perçue par la brigade comme une menace.

AlMustafa a souligné qu’aucun groupe armé ne sera autorisé à opérer en dehors de l’autorité du nouvel État, et il a rejeté les affirmations selon lesquelles les Émirats arabes unis auraient exercé des pressions pour cette dissolution, en pointant plutôt les dynamiques internes comme principal moteur.

English

Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa described the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade as a turning point in dismantling parallel military structures in southern Syria. He noted that the assassination of Bilal al-Droubi—who intended to join the Ministry of Defense—likely triggered the move, as it was perceived by the brigade as a threat.

AlMustafa emphasized that no armed group will be allowed to operate outside the new state’s authority, and dismissed claims that the UAE pressured for the dissolution, pointing instead to internal dynamics as the main driver.

French

Le chercheur Muhsen Almustafa estime que les premières étapes de la coordination sur le terrain entre la Turquie et Israël sont en cours afin d’éviter une confrontation et de délimiter les zones d’influence en Syrie. Il suggère qu’Ankara pourrait assumer le rôle de garant pour empêcher que le territoire syrien ne soit utilisé contre Israël.

Almustafa avertit que tout arrangement séparatiste ou tout schéma de protection externe menaçant l’unité de la Syrie constitue une ligne rouge pour la Turquie, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’administration autonome kurde. Pendant ce temps, les priorités de Washington restent centrées sur la prévention du chaos, la limitation de l’influence iranienne et la garantie d’une transition politique qui ne nuit pas à ses alliés traditionnels.

English

Researcher Muhsen Almustafa believes that initial steps of field coordination between Turkey and Israel are underway to avoid confrontation and delineate zones of influence in Syria. He suggests that Ankara could assume the role of guarantor to prevent Syrian territory from being used against Israel.

AlMustafa warns that any separatist arrangements or external protection schemes that threaten Syria’s unity are a red line for Turkey, particularly concerning the Kurdish autonomous administration. Meanwhile, Washington’s priorities remain focused on preventing chaos, curbing Iranian influence, and ensuring a political transition that does not harm its traditional allies

Spanish

El investigador Muhsen AlMustafa, del Centro Omran de Estudios Estratégicos, afirmó que el nuevo gobierno enfrenta enormes desafíos, pero su formación representó un paso necesario y urgente en el contexto de la nueva etapa tras la caída del régimen. Explicó que “la prioridad del presidente Ahmad al-Sharaa es erradicar la corrupción, mejorar la eficiencia de la administración pública y restablecer los servicios básicos para los ciudadanos”, y añadió que “la mayoría de los miembros del gabinete son tecnócratas seleccionados en función de su competencia e independencia, en un intento de superar el reparto de cuotas y las lealtades partidistas”.

AlMustafa agregó: “Aunque algunos ministros pertenecían al Gobierno de Salvación, al-Sharaa se comprometió a no formar un gabinete basado en criterios sectarios, y hay una representación geográfica más amplia que incluye ministros de Idlib y Deir ez-Zor”. Sin embargo, recalcó que “la representación por sí sola no es suficiente, ya que la eficacia es el criterio más importante”. En cuanto a la cuestión kurda, AlMustafa consideró que “no es posible esperar un acuerdo integral con la Administración Autónoma antes de formar el gobierno, ya que esto podría tardar meses, y el país no tiene el lujo de esperar”.

English

Researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies said that the new government faces enormous challenges, but its formation represented a necessary and urgent step in the context of the new phase after the regime’s fall. He explained that “President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s priority is to eradicate corruption, enhance the efficiency of public administration, and restore essential services for citizens,” adding that “the majority of cabinet members are technocrats chosen based on their competence and independence, in an attempt to move beyond power-sharing and partisan loyalties.”

AlMustafa added: “Although some ministers came from the Salvation Government, al-Sharaa committed to not forming a sectarian-based cabinet, and there is broader geographical representation that includes ministers from Idlib and Deir ez-Zor.” He stressed, however, that “representation alone is not enough, as effectiveness is the most important criterion.” Regarding the Kurdish issue, AlMustafa considered that “it is not possible to wait for a comprehensive agreement with the Autonomous Administration before forming the government, as this could take months, and the country cannot afford the luxury of waiting.”

Alongside sending a message to Turkey, Israel aims through its operations to completely destroy what remains of Syria’s military infrastructure, said researcher assistant Muhsen AlMustafa, a military and security affairs specialist at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, in a statement to Al-Khaleej Online.

• He explained that Israel is systematically destroying the entire military infrastructure in the buffer zone, expanding in Daraa, attacking areas in Damascus countryside, and bombing Hama military airport as well as the T-4 base in Homs.
• Israel is targeting the few remaining military sites in Syria after its frenzied bombing campaign that followed Assad’s fall, making rehabilitation extremely difficult.
• Tel Aviv seeks to ensure that the Syrian army does not return to southern Syria, thereby creating a demilitarized zone.
• Currently, the diplomatic option is the one on the table for the Syrian government. This explains why the Foreign Ministry is the one commenting on events, rather than the Defense Ministry, which would normally issue statements about such developments.
• While diplomacy is possible, the military option in its general sense is not.
• However, there is the possibility of supplying some fighters from Quneitra and Daraa with short-range, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Israeli helicopters flying at accessible altitudes.
• Such a move would increase pressure on Israel and could force it to reconsider its maneuvers.
• Israel, however, may not respond to diplomatic or political pressure, as it claims to be pursuing an agenda tied to its national security.
• It is expected that Russia could step in as a mediator between Damascus and Tel Aviv, guaranteeing the borders in their previous state.
• But this would place additional pressure on the new Syrian government, as it would need to provide Russia with concessions in return for taking on such a role.
• Israel seems determined to undermine stability in the region and unsettle the new Syrian government.
• Netanyahu, meanwhile, is exporting crises abroad and continuing wars to secure political gains domestically.
• Matters appear increasingly complex, particularly as the Americans have stated they have no involvement in what is happening in Syria—an explicit denial of responsibility.
• Israeli pressure on Syria is expected to persist for a longer period, since Israel destroyed military infrastructure in Quneitra, uprooted trees, and leveled military positions entirely.
• When Israel realized there was no direct response from the Syrian administration, it began to expand in the southern region and then pushed deeper inland.
• No one knows how far Israel may go, nor is it clear whether the new Syrian administration has a plan to confront this escalation—whether diplomatically or militarily.

Ayfer Erdoğan Şafak’s article on state failure in Syria, Libya and Yemen cites Power Centers in the Syrian Army on page 41 when discussing senior military and intelligence posts, and lists it in the bibliography on page 49.

Referenced work: Power Centers in the Syrian Army 2020:A Sectarian Approach.

Issue 23/2025 of SWP’s Middle East and North Africa Web Monitor lists the Arabic article “الجريدة الرسمية والنشر.. سوريا الجديدة ما بين السرية والشفافية” on page 14, in the section on Syria’s transition and reconstruction. The title and source link form a bibliographic entry, not an analytical endorsement of the article.

Original work (Arabic): الجريدة الرسمية والنشر.. سوريا الجديدة ما بين السرية والشفافية.

Published by ACCORD on 25 March 2025, this query response examines recruitment practices of Syria’s transitional government and other armed groups, including forced recruitment. Its discussion of status-settlement cards refers readers to “Syria: Humanitarian situation; Questions related to military service, especially in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA),” the webinar documentation published on 19 December 2024, for further information about status settlement under the Assad government.

While the security situation has improved since Assad’s fall—reducing the risk of arbitrary arrests, torture, and regime bombardments—Syria remains a post-war environment,” Muhsen al-Mustafa, an Istanbul-based researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, tells Raseef22. “This means conditions are still in flux, and full stabilization will take years.

The EUAA report cites previously published input in ACCORD’s documentation of the 24 October 2024 webinar when discussing child recruitment in northeastern Syria. The citation appears in footnote 304 on page 40, with the webinar documentation listed in the bibliography.

Earlier contribution: Syria: Humanitarian Situation and Military Service, Especially in the Syrian Arab Army: Documentation of the 24 October 2024 Webinar.