Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that the regime began about three years ago to demobilize a number of conscripts after they had spent years in reserve service.
He continued that the regime’s plan began to take shape about a year ago through issuing administrative orders to demobilize more reservists, in addition to the announcement by Major General Ahmad Suleiman, the director general of the General Administration at the Ministry of Defense in the regime’s government, about the intention to close the reserve service file and build a “professional army” based on volunteers.
AlMustafa pointed out that the regime’s current goal focuses on rebuilding the necessary human resources for the army primarily from volunteers, with the later aim of reducing reliance on conscripts, whether through mandatory or reserve service. The researcher noted that this step came because the regime realized, after years of the Syrian uprising, that those in compulsory service cannot be heavily relied upon due to the many defections and the widespread reluctance to join the army.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Noon Post that this represents “a shared interest and an additional link between the regime and these individuals, which opens a new door for corruption,” stressing that granting these leaders immunity for four years provides them with protection from illicit gains, from which security agency leaders will also benefit.
AlMustafa considered that militia leaders are seeking to expand their roles and increase their influence to new levels within civil institutions, after their roles were deeper in the military and security domains. He emphasized that these positions are “an opportunity to broaden their networks and connections, and thus their ability to continue either through armed force in the past, or now through official office.”
He added that after amassing huge sums of money through shabbiha practices, “tarfiq” (militia members escorting commercial trucks to impose levies under the pretext of protecting them from terrorists), blackmail, and other activities, these individuals now aspire to higher social status derived from official positions. Moreover, the regime could not find better representatives than them, especially since most are members of the Baath Party, according to AlMustafa.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, explained the phrase in the last clause to mean that anyone who meets the conditions listed at the end of the third clause will not need a new administrative order to be covered by the demobilization decision.
He told Enab Baladi that the other clauses of the administrative order did not make much difference in terms of details, since the reserve officers in the regime’s army are mostly holders of advanced degrees or university majors requiring five years of study, and therefore their numbers are not significantly large.
The researcher linked the latest administrative order to the changes that began to appear in the regime’s military institution since last year, pointing to the trend toward creating a “professional army” and addressing the issue of reserve service, which has been a major reason behind the migration of young people from regime-held areas. According to AlMustafa, the third clause of this order complements Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023, which allowed those liable for reserve service over the age of 40 to pay a financial substitute to avoid serving in the reserves.
Anders präsentiert sich die Lage im Libanon. Das Land hat eine knapp 375 Kilometer lange Grenze mit Syrien. Auch dieses Gebiet steht unter der Kontrolle von Baschar al-Assad. "Nachdem sie sich mit dem Assad-Regime auf die Namen der Rückkehrer geeinigt haben, finanzieren die libanesischen Sicherheitsbehörden nun die Rückführungen der syrischen Flüchtlinge an die Grenze", sagt Muhsen AlMustafa vom Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul im DW-Gespräch.
The situation in Lebanon is different as the country shares almost 375 km (235 miles) of border with Syrian areas under the control of Assad.
"The Lebanese General Security funds return trips to the border after they agreed on the returnees' names with the Assad regime," Muhsen AlMustafa, who researches security and military in Syria at the Istanbul-based think tank Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told DW.
This ACCORD response, published on 22 May 2024, examines when conscripts received military identity cards and metal dog tags, and the requirements for obtaining them. Drawing on his experience, Muhsen AlMustafa’s 13 May contribution placed their issuance after basic training. He also described the separable two-part tag and its identifying details, including the name, military number, rank and blood group.
Published on 16 May 2024, this ACCORD response draws on Muhsen AlMustafa’s 9 May contribution to explain birth registration when fathers were absent on military service. His input addresses the role of mothers and authorised relatives, required documents and the lack of a requirement for military confirmation of the father’s absence. It also discusses local practices, including discrepancies between actual and recorded birth dates.
This ACCORD response, published on 14 May 2024, examines registration in Syria of marriages concluded in Turkey. Muhsen AlMustafa’s 10 May contribution addresses documentation according to residence status, registration through lawyers or consular channels, and appointment difficulties. It also discusses practices concerning the recorded marriage location and changes to marriage dates in certain cases connected to birth registration, as documented at the time.
The ACCORD query response includes expert input from Muhsen al-Mustafa dated 24 April 2024 on the abolition of military field courts, case transfers and military justice procedures. It also cites the joint study “Military Field Court: Nullification and a No Change Approach” in its Arabic and English versions.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that it cannot yet be confirmed that the regime has gained from the Gaza war, although there may have been material benefits from the UAE in return for not escalating against Israel.
According to AlMustafa, Assad’s neutrality helped him ensure that his forces avoided further material and human losses on the military front, in case Israel launched attacks on military targets in Syria.
Regarding the mission assigned to “al-Nimr,” researcher assistant specializing in military affairs at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen AlMustafa, considered that al-Hassan “is an officer with the necessary capabilities to rebuild the Special Forces, due to his previous experience in counter-terrorism when he was in Air Force Intelligence and later his experience in transforming the Tiger militia into Division 25.
He is supposed to be the right person to rebuild the Special Forces regiments again, especially since they suffered heavy losses during military operations and were severely depleted.” AlMustafa noted that Division 25 continues to conduct parachute jumps, which is a fundamental training activity for the Special Forces due to the nature of their work.
The feature refers to “Baath Democracy: The 2020 Elections and Approaches to Entrenching Article Eight” when discussing the Baath Party’s parliamentary representation and its relationship with the state and society.
