Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in security and military affairs at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, described the changes as “natural within the framework of the regime’s restructuring plan, noting that the pace of changes in security positions is slower than in military ones.” Regarding his appointment to head National Security, AlMustafa explained that a set of qualities qualifies him for the position, most importantly “his closeness to Bashar al-Assad, and previously to Bassel al-Assad, which rooted his loyalty to the regime, despite his lack of extensive experience in foreign affairs compared to Mamlouk.”
On the assumption that removing old faces and appointing new ones is aimed at improving the regime’s image in the security front, AlMustafa commented: “Getting rid of the old faces does not necessarily mean opening a new page, as the current officers are also subject to Western sanctions due to violations against the Syrian people that they committed in recent years.”
uhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that the security restructuring announced by the Syrian regime has nothing to do with Arab initiatives, explaining that Damascus does not allow any external party to interfere in its security structures. He considers these changes to be a natural outcome for any regime that has gone through conflict, as it later seeks to review the strengths and weaknesses that emerged over the years.
AlMustafa points out that the regime may exploit Arab and Western calls for reform to craft a suitable image for itself, enabling it to tighten its grip on the street, but without touching the essence of its security structure or management style. He stresses that Assad’s changes remain superficial, as the new security figures are no different from the old ones in terms of methodology and performance. He also notes that strengthening the position of the “Baath Party” at this stage is part of the regime’s plan, as it relies on it as a political tool that provides cover and a partisan facade concealing its sectarian nature. In this way, the party is used as a means of mobilization and control, instead of implementing genuine political reform or opening the door to structural changes in power.
The Danish Immigration Service report includes a written research interview with Muhsen al-Mustafa conducted on 27 November 2023 about recruitment, reserve duty, exemptions, deferrals, draft evasion and desertion. The interview appears in Annex 1 and is cited in the report.
Mohammad Biqai’s article in Qalamoun’s double issue 25–26 cites Power Centers in the Syrian Army in its discussion of military organization and leadership posts. References appear on pages 41–42 and in the article bibliography on page 45.
Talal Mustafa’s article on sectarianism and totalitarianism under Hafez al-Assad cites “Power Centers in the Syrian Army” on page 66 in its discussion of military command.
Enab Baladi’s report includes direct comments from Muhsen al-Mustafa on Qahtan Khalil’s appointment as director of Air Force Intelligence and the public disclosure of senior military and security appointments. It also refers to an earlier post by al-Mustafa on X.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies specializing in military and security affairs, believes that building a professional army in Syria is far-fetched, as the army relies on loyalty in appointments and promotions rather than competence and professionalism, despite having an organizational structure of an Eastern style. He considers that human resources are the main obstacle to any transition toward a professional army.
“Any army can be professional, but we must ask how and why professionalism is needed. The regime’s army has the structure of a professional army and adopts the Eastern model in the division of its units. However, the core issue lies in its human element, which makes it difficult to move toward a professional army.”
Muhsen AlMustafa, researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies
He stresses that the chain of command in the Syrian army has been heavily influenced since 2011 by Russian and Iranian interventions, both through official channels and informal networks of influence, which weakened decision-making centralization and made it harder to control certain units. Although Bashar al-Assad officially remains in control of the chain of command, in practice this control is subject to balances imposed by allies.
AlMustafa points out that Iran is not interested in restructuring the army but focuses instead on bringing in militias and signing agreements that allow it to deploy and supply militarily, aiming to keep the regime weak but not collapsing. Russia, on the other hand, began steps toward restructuring but faced resistance from the regime itself, and its efforts slowed due to the war in Ukraine. Economically, he explains that the ongoing “restructuring” measures are administrative and low-cost, with the possibility of limited external funding to keep the army running, while heavy arms deals remain beyond the regime’s capacity.
EUAA query response Q69-2023 cites the joint study “Military Field Court: Nullification and a No Change Approach” in its discussion of the abolition of military field courts and the transfer of cases to military justice.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that Assad’s recent military decisions primarily aim to withdraw local militia members and integrate them into the army, since dismantling these groups all at once would be difficult in case they are needed in the future. In addition, the regime seeks to recruit new human resources from young men aged 18 to 32. He stressed that the regime is trying to attract them with financial incentives and exemptions from compulsory service, in order to secure their loyalty and push them to renew their contracts later, making the army’s ability to continue fighting dependent on the cohesion of these volunteers and militias.
AlMustafa added that financing these plans relies on two main mechanisms: printing unbacked currency and imposing service substitution fees inside and outside Syria, which has provided the regime with resources to pay salaries despite the economic crisis. He also noted that the restructuring of the army aims to reduce any loyalty to Russia or Iran and concentrate it solely in Bashar al-Assad. He considers that the current Minister of Defense, Ali Mahmoud Abbas, is the officer tasked with implementing this plan, being a technical figure previously prepared for this role.
Researcher Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies stated that “the privileges announced by the regime are not new; what is new is revealing them so explicitly.” He explained that the Syrian regime needs human resources in a routine sense, like any institution wishing to assert its presence amid the shortage of manpower in Syria, and that this is not necessarily related to military operations.
AlMustafa suggested that the regime’s goal through these contracts is to withdraw members from militias and integrate them into the official military institution. According to him, those who sign these contracts are subject to the same laws that govern military service under Legislative Decree No. 18 and Military Pensions Decree No. 17 of 2003, covering compensations and other entitlements in cases of death or permanent disability.
He clarified that compulsory service is waived for volunteers after five years of service under the law, considering that “these contracts are a continuation of the drive toward the militarization of society and military profiteering.” He added that through the salaries citizens receive under such contracts—which they cannot earn even in civilian jobs despite higher education degrees—it is clear that the regime seeks to militarize society, either by directing people into militias or using them as soldiers in the army. AlMustafa further explained that the regime exploits citizens’ needs through these contracts, offering financial incentives and encouragements to finish service within a defined timeframe, unlike in previous years.
The policy brief draws on “The Selective Return of Syrian Refugees” and “Drain Society, Feed the Military” to discuss selective return policies, differences between rural and urban returns, and property seizure linked to unfulfilled military service.
The BFA thematic report reuses earlier expert input through ACCORD’s response of 14 June 2023. The passages concern checkpoint procedures, reservists returning from abroad and the fifteen-day reporting period.
