Published on 23 September 2024, ACCORD’s thematic dossier brings together information on military service in Syria, covering recruitment, reserves, exemptions, draft evasion, desertion and self-defence duty. It incorporates direct input from Muhsen AlMustafa in 2023 on the limitations of online recruitment lists and the government’s ability to recruit in Daraa. The dossier also cites “Drain Society, Feed the Military,” published by Carnegie on 20 February 2020, in its discussion of the shift from provisional to executive asset seizure linked to failure to perform military service.
Le chercheur au Centre Omran for Strategic Studies, Mohsen al-Moustafa, souligne que la nomination d’un Premier ministre syrien placé sous sanctions européennes est avant tout un message politique. Selon lui, le régime veut montrer qu’il n’est pas disposé à faire des concessions ni à modifier son comportement en échange d’une levée des sanctions ou d’un retour sur la scène internationale.
Al-Moustafa rappelle que, conformément aux articles 97 et 98 de la Constitution de 2012, le poste de Premier ministre est dépourvu de tout pouvoir décisionnel réel. Son rôle se limite à l’exécution des directives du président et à la gestion administrative du gouvernement, tandis que le centre du pouvoir demeure entièrement entre les mains de Bachar al-Assad.
Ainsi, la nomination de Mohammad Ghazi Jalali ne change rien à la structure du régime en place. Elle consacre plutôt la centralisation continue du pouvoir entre les mains de la présidence et reflète la volonté du régime de maintenir le statu quo malgré les pressions internationales.
Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Muhsen AlMustafa, points out that the appointment of a Syrian Prime Minister under European sanctions is above all a political message. In his view, the regime seeks to demonstrate that it is unwilling to make concessions or change its behavior in exchange for the lifting of sanctions or its reintegration into the international arena.
AlMustafa recalls that, according to Articles 97 and 98 of the 2012 Constitution, the office of Prime Minister lacks any real decision-making power. His role is limited to executing the president’s directives and managing the government’s administrative affairs, while the center of power remains entirely in the hands of Bashar al-Assad.
Therefore, the appointment of Mohammad Ghazi Jalali brings no change to the structure of the existing regime. Instead, it reinforces the continued concentration of power in the presidency and reflects the regime’s desire to preserve the status quo despite international pressure.
According to Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant specializing in civil-military relations at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, the Syrian regime is seeking to attract volunteers in order to “form a solid bloc within the army.” This “solid bloc” relies on volunteers who demonstrate greater loyalty to the regime compared to conscripts serving under compulsory service, who are seen as less reliable due to social and sectarian divisions, he told Al-Hurra.
He added that “the demobilization of groups from reserve and compulsory service is part of this strategy to ease burdens on certain civilian sectors,” and also “an attempt to reduce waves of asylum as many young people migrate to escape prolonged service, in addition to other reasons for displacement and migration.” While the exact future form of that “army” is still unclear, AlMustafa believes the goal is to “create a military force composed of individuals with stronger loyalty, higher skills, and attractive financial benefits, allowing the regime to reinforce its military and security grip more effectively.”
AlMustafa explained that “the term professional army is far too big for Assad’s army.” He noted that “the core criterion within it is loyalty, not professionalism, although the term ‘professional’ is usually applied to volunteer-based armies.” Nonetheless, this does not mean the regime’s future army “will not train or adopt new tactics, but it will fall far short of confronting an organized military force or another army, while maintaining a high destructive effectiveness against the Syrian people,” the researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies concluded.
The news report reuses earlier interview remarks about personnel needs and possible militia integration while covering the volunteer contracts announced in September 2024.
The study draws on “The Selective Return of Syrian Refugees” to examine obstacles to refugee return from Lebanon, particularly security-clearance requirements and the security services’ rejection of most return requests.
Published on 5 September 2024, this ACCORD response draws on information and sources provided by Muhsen AlMustafa on 27 August 2024, including assistance in translating the Defence Ministry’s conscription-order template and notification procedures. His contribution addresses order contents, required stamps and signatures, recruitment offices, differences between compulsory and reserve-service orders, and ways of assessing document authenticity.
NMA’s article “What If Syria’s Dictator Had Not Belonged to a Minority?” cites “Power Centers in the Syrian Army” in notes 12 and 30 and “Brothers in Arms” in note 29 while discussing the composition of military leadership.
This ACCORD response, published on 30 August 2024, examines processing times for military-service exemption payments after at least one year abroad. In an email dated 27 August, Muhsen AlMustafa identified a Syrian embassy guide specifying 34 working days. He distinguished that stated timeframe from his assessment that processing could take longer in practice, including delays caused by errors in the documents.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, explained to Enab Baladi that the amendments introduced by the decree did not address the age of reserve military service itself, but rather paragraph “W,” which allowed those paying the financial substitute (whether enlisted or not) to pay $4,800 or its equivalent in Syrian pounds, with a reduction of $200 for each month of service performed by the enlisted person. Paragraph “W” had been added under Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023.
The researcher interpreted the addition of Decree No. 20, which introduced the option of paying a reserve service substitute for disabled individuals (set at $3,000), as consistent with the regime’s current effort to present itself as offering more “care” to citizens with disabilities, by allowing them to pay a lower substitute than that stated in paragraph “W” of Article 26. It also expands the age group eligible to pay the substitute, meaning greater financial gains for the regime.
According to an analytical article published by Muhsen AlMustafa at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies on August 6, titled “Syria’s Reserve Military Service Transformations and Objectives”, the plan regarding reserve service is driven by an attempt to ease the burden on social groups within regime-controlled areas, especially after large waves of migration, of which reserve service has been one of the main causes, aside from other economic or social reasons.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, believes that the main objective of this campaign is to recover the looted funds from the party’s financial allocations and resources, after many years of rampant corruption inside the central leadership of the party. He told Syria TV: “It seems that Bashar al-Assad has granted the new deputy secretary-general, Ibrahim al-Hadid, the authority and green light to carry out the investigation, in an attempt to reclaim the stolen funds.”
AlMustafa stressed that the regime seeks through this campaign to portray the party as a transparent institution subject to oversight and evaluation, which strengthens the image of the regime’s government and state institutions in fighting corruption. On whether the anti-corruption campaign is a preemptive step to address internal or external pressures, AlMustafa pointed out that it is not the result of direct internal or external pressure on the party, but stems from Assad’s approach toward tighter control and oversight within it.
He explained: “This campaign is a message to the new members that they are under surveillance and subject to accountability at any time, thereby creating a constant state of apprehension that forces them to work more strictly.” He predicted that the campaign could expand to include all state institutions, with the possibility of appointing a new government within the next two months.
AlMustafa considered that there is a strong connection between exposing corruption and changes in the party leadership. He said: “The investigation came only three months after the formation of a new central leadership of the party. Without this entirely new leadership, corruption could not have been exposed.” He added that the old financially corrupt leadership would never have revealed the violations it committed but would instead have concealed the traces of its corruption.
Published on 22 July 2024, this ACCORD response draws on Muhsen AlMustafa’s 16 July contribution concerning nursing-qualified conscripts’ assignments to military hospitals and medical units, training and service durations as described at the time. It also reuses an earlier assessment through the EUAA’s October 2023 report, linking certain exemptions tied to public-institution service to shortages of medical personnel caused by emigration.
The judgment of Germany’s Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia discusses an assessment reported by ACCORD in September 2022 while weighing evidence on the implementation of military-service penalties in Syria. The reference to the earlier contribution appears in paragraphs 77 and 78.
