Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, pointed out the concentration of the Syrian regime forces’ activity in the period immediately following the earthquake. At the official level, the “army” took part in rescue operations and rubble removal, while military hospitals received civilian casualties for treatment.
The “army clubs” also hosted a number of families, without it being clear whether they were relatives of military personnel or civilians, while the security forces under the Ministry of Interior were mobilized in response to the earthquake, though without a clear role in relief operations such as distributing aid, providing shelter, medical care, and other services.
Muhsen al-Mustafa, Forscher am 'Omran Center for Strategic Studies' in Istanbul, sagt "Da die Rückkehrer größtenteils nicht in die vom Assad-Regime kontrollierten Gebiete zurückkehren, haben sie keine Angst vor Verfolgung oder Verhaftung durch die Sicherheitskräfte der Regierung"
Die größte Bedrohung gehe aber nach wie vor von Machthaber Baschar al-Assad aus, der sie daran hindern würde, in die Gebiete zurückzukehren, aus denen sie ursprünglich kommen. "Wenn sie jedoch die von der Opposition gehaltenen Gebiete nicht verlassen, besteht die größte Gefahr für sie darin, vom Assads Waffen getroffen zu werden", so al-Mustafa.
Muhsen alMustafa, a researcher at the Istanbul-based Omran Center for Strategic Studies.said "Because the returnees are mostly not going back into areas controlled by the Assad regime, they have no fear of pursuit or arrest by government security forces,".
"The biggest threat is still Bashar Assad, who would prevent them from returning to the areas they originally came from [elsewhere in Syria] either because the area has been destroyed, or because of further government oppression and persecution. But if they don't go any further than opposition-held areas, then the most likely danger for them would be shelling carried out by Assad's army from time to time," alMustafa said.
The Swedish Migration Agency report cites “Power Centers in the Syrian Army” and “The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military” in its description of military leadership, the National Security Bureau and the leadership of Military Intelligence.
The researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), Muhsen AlMustafa, told Enab Baladi that the targeting operations are confined to three warring parties: the opposition, the regime, and fighters of the Islamic State organization in southern Syria. He considered that the continuation of these targeting operations in the governorate is evidence of the “security failure” of the regime’s agencies and forces there. As for benefit and harm, the researcher explained that the regime does not view human losses as a measure of benefit or harm; what matters to it is controlling the land and imposing its authority over it, regardless of the number of dead from any side, including its own forces.
The researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Muhsen AlMustafa, believes that the “tactical operational projects” that the Syrian regime has been announcing repeatedly aim to “maintain combat readiness, especially since military operations have decreased, and therefore new soldiers must be brought into the battle atmosphere.”
AlMustafa told Al-Hurra: “At the beginning of the revolution, Syrian soldiers did not always carry weapons. But now the situation is different.” Although “Russia is constantly monitoring and present,” the decision to carry out these maneuvers comes from “the Syrian regime’s leadership, while the Russian side’s role is limited to monitoring performance.” Considering that Maher Al-Assad, Bashar’s brother, appeared for the first time in “military uniform” and in training, the researcher explained: “He is a division commander, and his presence is ordinary. We should not place him in an ivory tower,” as he put it.
The report cites “The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military: Formal and Informal Tracks” in its account of military appointments and Russian and Iranian influence within the armed forces.
As part of a report by the Austrian Red Cross and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation on conscription and military service in Syria, a set of answers was provided via email as a research contribution by Muhsen AlMustafa; the report is available in German.
The article “Drain Society, Feed the Military” was also used as a reference in the report.
Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, considered that the aim of Legislative Decree No. 16 of 2022, which stipulates the acceptance of doctors as obligated to public service for ten years including military service, is to try to benefit as much as possible from these doctors, especially since it is applied for the first time to a civilian sector, while previously it was in the police sector when a volunteer served five years in order to waive mandatory service.
AlMustafa, who is also a non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (timep), pointed out that the salary will be “the salary of the contracting institution, which here is a civilian body, and the doctor will receive the salary corresponding to his academic degree according to the recognized salary scale, and the Basic Law of State Employees will apply to him.” He also considered that doctors would prefer to emigrate outside Syria due to the large financial returns, in addition to the fact that many doctors are unwilling to take such jobs in the government sector, for a period of ten years.
The assistant researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (Timep), Muhsen AlMustafa, explained in an interview with Enab Baladi that the decision related to military service is “closely” tied to the regime’s attempt to curb the migration of skilled professionals. He cited Decree No. 16, which the regime’s president issued two days after the decision, accepting a number of medical students and medical degree holders as obligated to serve in public institutions. He also believes that the Syrian regime is trying to limit the migration of doctors not only because of the shortage in medical staff, but also because, from the regime’s perspective, a medical student studying in Syrian universities for more than six years and then emigrating to work abroad constitutes a “financial loss.”
The report includes direct comments by Muhsen al-Mustafa on the roles of the United States, Russia and Turkey in Syria, the distinction between military patrols and territorial control, and the limits of arrangements over areas of influence.
