Research contributions, statements, and references

Los sirios temen más al hambre que a las bombas

Spanish

No se puede obviar el factor político en un conflicto como el de Siria, en el que el presidente El Asad “ha castigado a toda la población por rebelarse contra él hace 12 años”, tal y como declara Muhsen alMustafa, analista asociado al centro de análisis Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) de Washington.

“En concreto, las poblaciones rurales y agrícolas fueron importantes propulsores de la revolución, a diferencia de las áreas progubernamentales”, explica el experto sirio. “A eso se añade que muchos ciudadanos se han visto desplazados por la represión del régimen y los ataques terrestres y aéreos indiscriminados sobre sus localidades, incluidas las tierras de cultivo”, de las cuales obtenía algún tipo de sustento cerca del 50% de la población.

“La escasez de combustible en la pasada década también ha afectado mucho a la agricultura”, agrega AlMustafa, quien considera que el Gobierno de El Asad no cuenta en la actualidad con los medios ni con el personal técnico para relanzar el sector, aparte de “la corrupción que afecta a todas las administraciones públicas”. Y aclara que “lo más importante para el régimen era mantenerse en el poder. Por ello, ha descuidado todas las áreas de desarrollo del país”, concluye.

Engliah

One cannot overlook the political factor in a conflict like Syria, where President Assad “has punished the entire population for rebelling against him 12 years ago,” as stated by Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant affiliated with the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) in Washington.

The Syrian expert explained that “rural and agricultural communities were key drivers of the revolution, unlike the pro-government areas.” He added that “many citizens have been displaced by the regime’s repression and by indiscriminate ground and air attacks on their towns, including farmland,” from which nearly 50% of the population used to secure some form of livelihood.

AlMustafa noted that “the fuel shortage over the past decade has also deeply affected agriculture,” considering that Assad’s government currently lacks both the resources and the technical staff to revive the sector, in addition to “the corruption that plagues all public administrations.” He emphasized that “the most important thing for the regime was to remain in power; therefore, it neglected all areas of the country’s development,” he concluded.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and a fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, revealed to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that “the head of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, Hossam Louka, has three children: Nouri, Natasha, and Satanay. While Nouri is pursuing graduate studies in Russia, Natasha completed her studies in pharmacy and married the son of Ibrahim Othman, head of the Atomic Energy Commission of the Syrian regime. As for Satanay, she studied at the Higher Institute of Business Administration in Damascus.” AlMustafa suggested that she is likely to be employed at a United Nations office.

He explained that “employment in the UN office where Louka’s daughter works is secured through recommendations from influential individuals and via informal networks within the UN in Damascus,” adding that “other applicants may even be intimidated so that the candidate favored by the Syrian regime ultimately takes the position.” AlMustafa stressed that “having employees in UN offices who are close to the regime or related to its leaders is nothing new; while such employment might be legally sound, it contradicts the values the UN claims to represent.”

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, pointed out the concentration of the Syrian regime forces’ activity in the period immediately following the earthquake. At the official level, the “army” took part in rescue operations and rubble removal, while military hospitals received civilian casualties for treatment.

The “army clubs” also hosted a number of families, without it being clear whether they were relatives of military personnel or civilians, while the security forces under the Ministry of Interior were mobilized in response to the earthquake, though without a clear role in relief operations such as distributing aid, providing shelter, medical care, and other services.

German:

Muhsen al-Mustafa, Forscher am 'Omran Center for Strategic Studies' in Istanbul, sagt "Da die Rückkehrer größtenteils nicht in die vom Assad-Regime kontrollierten Gebiete zurückkehren, haben sie keine Angst vor Verfolgung oder Verhaftung durch die Sicherheitskräfte der Regierung"

Die größte Bedrohung gehe aber nach wie vor von Machthaber Baschar al-Assad aus, der sie daran hindern würde, in die Gebiete zurückzukehren, aus denen sie ursprünglich kommen. "Wenn sie jedoch die von der Opposition gehaltenen Gebiete nicht verlassen, besteht die größte Gefahr für sie darin, vom Assads Waffen getroffen zu werden", so al-Mustafa.

English

Muhsen alMustafa, a researcher at the Istanbul-based Omran Center for Strategic Studies.said "Because the returnees are mostly not going back into areas controlled by the Assad regime, they have no fear of pursuit or arrest by government security forces,".

"The biggest threat is still Bashar Assad, who would prevent them from returning to the areas they originally came from [elsewhere in Syria] either because the area has been destroyed, or because of further government oppression and persecution. But if they don't go any further than opposition-held areas, then the most likely danger for them would be shelling carried out by Assad's army from time to time," alMustafa said.

The Swedish Migration Agency report cites “Power Centers in the Syrian Army” and “The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military” in its description of military leadership, the National Security Bureau and the leadership of Military Intelligence.

Referenced works: Power Centers in the Syrian Army 2020:A Sectarian Approach؛ The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military: Formal and Informal Tracks.

The researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), Muhsen AlMustafa, told Enab Baladi that the targeting operations are confined to three warring parties: the opposition, the regime, and fighters of the Islamic State organization in southern Syria.
He considered that the continuation of these targeting operations in the governorate is evidence of the “security failure” of the regime’s agencies and forces there. As for benefit and harm, the researcher explained that the regime does not view human losses as a measure of benefit or harm; what matters to it is controlling the land and imposing its authority over it, regardless of the number of dead from any side, including its own forces.

The researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Muhsen AlMustafa, believes that the “tactical operational projects” that the Syrian regime has been announcing repeatedly aim to “maintain combat readiness, especially since military operations have decreased, and therefore new soldiers must be brought into the battle atmosphere.”

AlMustafa told Al-Hurra: “At the beginning of the revolution, Syrian soldiers did not always carry weapons. But now the situation is different.” Although “Russia is constantly monitoring and present,” the decision to carry out these maneuvers comes from “the Syrian regime’s leadership, while the Russian side’s role is limited to monitoring performance.” Considering that Maher Al-Assad, Bashar’s brother, appeared for the first time in “military uniform” and in training, the researcher explained: “He is a division commander, and his presence is ordinary. We should not place him in an ivory tower,” as he put it.

The EUAA report cites “Drain Society, Feed the Military” when describing amendments to Article 97 of Syria’s military-service legislation.

Referenced work: Drain Society, Feed the Military.

The report cites “The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military: Formal and Informal Tracks” in its account of military appointments and Russian and Iranian influence within the armed forces.

Referenced work: The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military: Formal and Informal Tracks.

As part of a report by the Austrian Red Cross and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation on conscription and military service in Syria, a set of answers was provided via email as a research contribution by Muhsen AlMustafa; the report is available in German.

The article “Drain Society, Feed the Military” was also used as a reference in the report.

Muhsen AlMustafa, a researcher assistant at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, considered that the aim of Legislative Decree No. 16 of 2022, which stipulates the acceptance of doctors as obligated to public service for ten years including military service, is to try to benefit as much as possible from these doctors, especially since it is applied for the first time to a civilian sector, while previously it was in the police sector when a volunteer served five years in order to waive mandatory service.

AlMustafa, who is also a non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (timep), pointed out that the salary will be “the salary of the contracting institution, which here is a civilian body, and the doctor will receive the salary corresponding to his academic degree according to the recognized salary scale, and the Basic Law of State Employees will apply to him.” He also considered that doctors would prefer to emigrate outside Syria due to the large financial returns, in addition to the fact that many doctors are unwilling to take such jobs in the government sector, for a period of ten years.

The assistant researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (Timep), Muhsen AlMustafa, explained in an interview with Enab Baladi that the decision related to military service is “closely” tied to the regime’s attempt to curb the migration of skilled professionals. He cited Decree No. 16, which the regime’s president issued two days after the decision, accepting a number of medical students and medical degree holders as obligated to serve in public institutions.
He also believes that the Syrian regime is trying to limit the migration of doctors not only because of the shortage in medical staff, but also because, from the regime’s perspective, a medical student studying in Syrian universities for more than six years and then emigrating to work abroad constitutes a “financial loss.”